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Abstract
This is a study of the political activist groups that have
emerged in the early and mid 1980s in the context of the
social-political system of Hong Kong. While the origin of
the groups can be traced back to the political awakening of
the educated youth of Hong Kong in late 6os, the
profileration of the political groups was primarily
conditioned by the Sino-Britisn negotiation on Hong Kong's
future, with further stimulants provided by the introduction
of local elections. The political groups in Hong Kong, it is
found, are basically small primitive organisations formed by
young educated middle class and they function primarily as
social and political commentators. The most outstanding
characteristics of these groups are their moderation and
convergnce of stands in public which reflect their weak
positions in the system. What have limited their space of
manoeuvre are not only that they can affect changes in Hong
Kong only in cooperation with the Chinese and Hong Kong
authorities, but also their isolation as a result of the
passivity of the Hong Kong public. This passivity, it is
argued, reflects, the conditions of Hong Kong as a dependent
industrial capitalist colony on the soils of socialist China
which do not favour the development of commitment but foster
a deep sense of powerlessness on one hand, and reduce the
need of collective solution of problems through political
participation on the other hand.
1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Object and Aims of Study
This is a study of a relatively new phenomenon in Hong
Kong--- so new that there is no standard term to
characterise my object of study. 'Political activist group'
is the best term that I come across, but its meaning is far
from unambiguous, as one form or another of of political
activities can be found among very different types of
organisations in Hong Kong. My main interest, however, is on
the 'newly emergent political forces' in Hong Kong, and I
would define my focus of study as groups that are formed
explicitly for the purpose of influencing government
policies and future political changes, and are concerned
primarily with central level political issues. In other
words, my object- of study are the 'political opinion
groups' and 'political participation groups'
that have mushroomed in Hong Kong in the參 政 團 体
early and mid 1980s. What are sometimes simply called
political groups.
As new actors in the political arena that have managed
to catch a quite considerable amoumt of public attention,
the political activist groups are by themselves interesting
論 政 團 体
2objects of study but more importantly, they can be seen as
a key to the understanding of the conditions and forces that
have shaped and are shaping society and politics in Hong
Kong. Therefore, in the present study, these groups would be
related to the larger social structures in Hong Kong, and it
is hoped that through a study of the development and
activities of these groups, we can learn something about the
wider social and political system in Hong Kong.
Approach
Analytically, there can be three possible perspectives
in the study of these political activist groups. First, we
can start with the individual actors, finding out the
values, motivations, self-conception of the participants in
these groups as well as how they define their situation and
act accordingly. Secondly, we can start with the structural
elements of society which define the distribution of power
and resources and see how they shape the development and
role of these political activist groups. Thirdly, we can
trace the development of these groups and see how they are
related to historical events and trends. In short, there
can be an action, a structural, and a historical approach,
which focus respectively on the subjective, objective, and
developmental dimensions of these groups. In reality,
3however, it is obvious that these three dimensions are
related to each. other and all the three approaches are
indispensable for a sufficiently complex understanding of
these groups. What would be attempted in the present study
is, therefore, a combination of the three approaches, an
approach that is especially necessary as this study attempts
to achieve not only understanding of the groups and their
operation but also the social and political processes they
embedded in.
Sources of Information
Information for this study are collected from
divergent sources. The first source of information are
reports of interviews and events found in the press of Lcng
Kong. y second source of information are documents and
publications of the political activist groups. A third
source of information are reports on researches done by
youth and student bodies in Hong Kong on these political
groups. As a supplement to information thus collected, The
author has interviewed twelve individuals from nine
political groups. All of them have been active in the
activities of the political groups, eight of them being
founding menibers.The interviews are semi-structured, while I
nave in mind the items of information that I want to
4collect, priority is given to smooth development of dialogue
to facilitate communication.The questions can be divided
into two categories: the first concerning the. formation,
organisation, membership characteristics, and mode of
operation of the political groups the second concerns the
interviewees' evaluation of the situation and they are
invited to comment on the social and political situation of
Hong Kong and their own role in it. And the interviewees
would sometimes provide also information on political groups
they do not belong reflecting perhaps the small circle
character of political activists in Hong Kong (1). Besides,
I have also participated in forum and seminars organised by
these groups to have a first-hand observation of their
activities. There are also many informal occasions that I
talk with people I know about these political groups. While
I am not a member in any one of the groups, it should be
noted, I am socially close to those participate in their
activities, both in a. sociological and a personal sense.
Some of my knowledge about these groups is, therefore,
personal in nature. While the methodology of this study is
not well-controlled, and the danger of biasing effect of
personal sympathies is always present, the study is based on
a kind of understanding carefully controlled studies cannot
often obtain. Hong Kong is in fact a small place where
people cluster together and this is what give the present
5study a certain community-study like character.
Analytical Framework
In chapter 2, a basic picture of the social-political
system of Hong Kong and the underlying historical and
external conditions would be presented and possible
structural origins of the political groups located. Chapter
3 would be a historical account of the origin and
development of the groups in the background of social and
political changes in Hong Kong since mid 1960s. Chapter 4
provides an overview of the social bases, organisation,
ideology, and activities of the political groups as well as
the activists' subjective orientations. Case-studies of six
groups would be presented in chapter 5 to provide a deeper
understanding of the ideology, organisation, and development
of the groups. Chapter 6 would present arguments on what
have limited the development of the groups. A summary of
what has been discovered in the study and some projections
into the future would be provided in the concluding chapter.
LImits of the Study
Social scientific researches on Hong Kong politics are
still in an early stage of development. While existinc
6studies are helpful in exposing the systemic qualities of
the social and political structure of Hong-Kong, there have
been few studies on political changes in Hong Kong after
ther late 60s with social movement and historical
perspectives. The present study, therefore, has to be
preliminary and exploratory in nature. Moreover, while the
account of political groups presented in the later chapters
would appear quite comprehensive, I would not pretend to
know everything about the groups. Some of the information I
used, in fact, is just filtered hearsay, and the
descriptions may appear from time to time impressionistic.
The purpose is, in this preliminary stage, to provide a
general picture and some tentative arguments, with the help
of which, more in-depth, carefully controlled investigations
can be made.
Note
(1)I rely mainly on the classified newspaper clippings
available in the Center for Hong Kong Studies and Students'
Union of the Chinese University of Hong Kcng for press
reports. The periodicals I have consulted for information
include Focus, Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, Mirror,
Pai-Shing, and Wide-Angle. I have available two research
reports, one by the Social Affairs Committee of Hong Kong
Federation of Students, one by the 'Youth and Society
Project' of Lai Tak Youth Centre, both containing records of
of interviews with leaders of the political groups conducted
in 1985. My own interviews were conducted in a period
between February and May in 1986. The nine groups whose
members (in one case, ex-member) I have interviewed are
Association for Democracy and and People's Livilihood,
7Association for Democracy and Public Justice, Hong Kong
Affairs Society, Hong Kong Observers, Hong Kong People's
Association, Meeting Point, New Hong* Kong Society,
Progressive Hong Kong Society, and Society for social
Research. If we take members in the 'Joint Conference of
Political Groups on. Basic Law' as the population, then I
have interviewed 9 out of 17 groups and should have included
the more developed and dynamic groups, while information
about others are availabe from other sources. These 17
groups, however, include Civic Association and Reform Club,
which were formed in the early 50s, as well as Society for
Community Organisation which functions primarily as
organiser of community movements, outside the scope of
attention of the present study.
8CHAPTER 2
Hong Kong Society and Politics: a Structural Sketch
Essential features of the social-political system of
Hong Kong would be outlined in this chapter through a review
of existing literature. The purpose is to locate the
possible structural origins of the political activist groups
as well as to give a picture of the socio-political
environment in which these groups must manoeuvre.
Historical and External Conditions
The social and political structures of Hong Kong do
not emerge out of a vacuum. Rather they should be taken as
specific outcomes of the historical and external conditions
that continuously shape Hong Kong society. An account of
these conditions is therefore necessary for an adequate
understanding of the bases and dynamics of the social-
political system of Hong Kong and this would be attempted in
this section.
9Constitutionally, Hong Kong is a British colony with
its political status based on three treaties signed between
the British and the Manchu government of China--- one of
which, that relates to an area now constitutes Hong Kong's'
rural hinterland as well as an important portion of its
urban areas, provides for a leasehold that is due to expiry
in 1997. As a port on the South Chinese coast, however,
Hong Kong was acquired not for its own sake. Rather, it
serves as a base for the furtherance of British strategic
and economic interests in the Far East, especially that
relate to China (See Endacott, 1964:20-38, for a description
of British considerations in acquiring Hong Kong and the
initial policies of the British government towards Hong
Kong).
After the Second World war, with the withdrawal. of the
British Empire from the Far East and the rise of China as
big Communist power, the continual survivalof Hong Kong as a
British colony becomes dependent on the tacit acceptance of
the Peking regime which, though deriving considerable
benefits from Hong Kong's present status, has refused from
the outset to recognise the three unequal treaties on which,
in the British point of view, the legitimacy of the present
administration of Hong Kong is based (For a discussion of
China's position on Hong Kong and its implications, see
10
England Rear, 1981: 15-17 Harris, 1978:8-10, 162-170
Miners, 1981:18-38).
Inevitably, this peculiar situation of Hong Kcng has.
far-reaching consequences. 'Firstly, ever since the island
of Hong Kong was ceded to the British in 1843, the colonial
government sees its primary role as to provide an orderly
framework for economic pursuits, limiting its scope of
activities as far as possible, a task much simplified by the
fact that Hong Kong is a city-state (England Rear, 1981:5
Lau, 1982a: 40-44). Secondly, prior to 1949, except for a
minority, the population of Hong Kong is transient in nature
with continuous two-way flow between Hong Kong and China.
It is only after the Communist takeover of China in 1949
that Hong Kong acquires a relatively stable population and
post-war Hong Kong is, therefore, a 'new society' made up
primarily of immigrants from various parts of China, a
characteristic that cannot fail to leave deep imprints on
social organisation and behaviour (Hambro, 1955:11-20 Las
1982a:67). Thirdly, there is always a cloud of uncertainty
over the future of Hong Kong which is now basically a
function of Chinese politics. And as later discussions
would show, actively and passively, policies and politics of
China have never ceased to be one of the most important
influences in social and political changes in Hong Kong.
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Britain's continued interest in, and China's
toleration of Hong Kong, however, depend ultimately on
another condition: Hong Kong's ability to generate wealth.
A more fundamental set of conditions circumscribing social
and political changes in Hong Kong, therefore, flows from
Hong Kong's particular mode of economic development.
Hong Kong was first developed as an entrepot. From
the 1950s onward, however, Hong Kong turns to.tiar_ds
manufacturing for exports which has become the mainstay of
its economy and ushered in an age of sustained economic
growth. The general rise in real incomes and expansicn of
opportunities for upward social mobility associated with
economic growth in Hong Kong is definitely conducive to the
widespread acceptance of the status quo, and the general
perception that money is gained from outs .de rather than
simply divided between the rich and the poor can serve as a
further depressant to social and political conflicts. More
still, Hong Kong° s reliance on foreign capital and mar sets
provides the government with ready arguments to justify its
limited role in regulating the economy and redistributing
income, and cushion: i w from radical eritic.ism3 (Lau,
198/2a:173-174 To put it in a dramatic way, the econAmy is
the most effective conservative' force in Hong Kong
12
The socially stabilizing influence of the economy,
however, is only one side of the story. An element of
'instability' is built in the system of a small, open
economy like Hong Kong as everything depends so much on'
factors beyond the control of local actors. Hong Kong
economy is known for its flexibility, but flexibility is not
costless, and anyway, there are limits to flexibility (See
Youngson, 1982:157-159 for a discussion of the dilemma of
economic development in Hong Kong). 'Stability and
prosperity' are now almost 'sacred' terms in Hong Kong, but
that they are so frequently stressed reflects perhaps an
awareness that the bases of that prosperity is very
precarious (though people often have only the courage to
admit the political threats), and the consequences of a
prolonged economic downturn in Hong Kong, it is commonly
believed, would be catastrophic.
In any society, political actors are never free in
their choice of courses of action. They are always
confronted by a pregiven set of circumstances and there are
always variables that are not within their control. One
point the above discussions in this section attempt to show,
however, is that the space of manoeuvre for political actors
in Hong Kong are particularly limited, especially for those
that do not identify with the status quo, for Hong Kong is
13
not only a dependent economy, but also a 'dependent polity'
(1).
Features of the Social-Political System and Corresponding
Normative Orientations
Hong Kong, according to Lau (1982a), constitutes a
'minimally- integrated social-political system' in which a
secluded bureaucracy is superimposed on an atomistic Chinese
society composed of inward- looking and self-seeking
familial groups.
The administrative brueaucracy, though still formally
'colonial', has been largely autonomous from directions from
Britain (Kuan, 1979: 149-151) and it nearly monopolises
political power in Hong Kong: it sets down the rules of the
political game and carefully guards against the intrusion of
other forces into the polity, the boundary of which is
almost coterminous with the bureaucracy's own boundary.
Concentrating public power in its own hands, the
bureaucratic administration in Hong Kong, however, refrains
from actively intervening in social and economic affairs---
a self-imposed limitation of role to avoid entanglement in
conflicts (Lau, 1982a:26-29, 40-44).
As regards to politics and political activities
14
outside the bounds of the bureaucracy, the basic attitude of
the bureaucratic administration in Hong Kong is one of
suspicion and antagonism, a natural product of bureaucratic
mentality and the structural positon of a colonial
government. Seeing themselves as guardians of common
interests in Hong Kong, the bureaucrats tend to see politics
as a 'nuisance' that bring in unnecessary complications in
their business of 'managing' Hong Kong. Moreover, it is
afraid that political activities may threaten the hegemony
of the bureaucracy, or may even bring in outside forces
detrimental to political stability in Hong Kong. In fact,
the policy to eradicate politics has been laid down since
the early history of Hong Kong and general 'anti-political'
or 'apolitical' or%+station of the Hong Kong public should
be regarded as partly a prcduct of this policy (Lau,
1982a:36-37). Exemplary of the bureaucracy's attitude
towards politics is the view expressed by Sir Alexander
Grantham, the Governor of Hong gong from 1947 to 1958, in a
speech to the Legislative Council on March 8, 1950:
We cannot permit Hong Kong to be
the battleground for contending
political parties or ideologies.
We are just simple traders who
want to get on well our daily
round and common task. This may
not be very noble, but at any rate
it does not disturb others. (Hong
Kong Hansard, 1950:41, quoted in
Lau, 1982a:36)
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Complementary to the bureaucracy's self-imposed
limitation of role is the Chinese society's desire to be
left alone, or for the sake of symmetry, 'self-imposed
demobilisation' (2).' Viewing Hong Kong primarily as a
refuge for political upheavals or a marketplace for
economic gains, the Chinese people in Hong Kong have minimum
identification with the society they live in and treat it
essentially as an instrument for the pursuit of familial and
individual interests, which, in the context of Hong Kong,
are primarily material. Moreover, having come to Hong Kong
voluntarily to subject themselves to colonial rule, the
predominant majority of Hong Kong Chinese have little taste
for anti-colonialism (indeed, any political ideology),
especially when it means the extension of Peking's rule to
Hong Kong. Therefore, provided that their mundane needs are
reasonably satisfied, it can be expected that the people of
Hong Kong would have little inclination to impinge on the
political arena (Lau, 1982a:68-69, 74-75, 87-88).
Further still, even if they have harboured discontents
against the government, mobilisation of the Chinese people
in Hong Kong would be extremely difficult. The first
barrier is psychological. Pervasive among the people of
Hong Kong is a sense of political powerlessness, and such an
attitude would lead more easily to resignation than to
16
active political action in times of difficulties or crises
(Lau, 1982a:105- 109). The second barrier is
organisational. As a result of avoidance of outsiders and
low social participation on the part of Chinese familial
groups in Hong Kong, intermediate organisations are sparse
and weak in Hong Kong, and they therefore cannot serve as
effective loci for mobilisation (Lau, 1981:867=874
1982a:89-95, 130-148).
The general impression is that people in Hong Kong
tend to associate politics with bad and terrible things,
wars, chaos, faction strife, conspiracies, etc, and see
political activities as something pursued by strange,
self-seeking individuals. For those that have a more
positive image of politics, they still tend to see it as
something far removed from their daily life, which can be
and should be kept out of. In fact, I suspect it is only
recently that the people of Hong Kong become aware that
there are politics, apart from public affairs, in Hong Kong,
too.
The structural counterpart of the mutually reinforcing
anti- political orientations of the bureaucratic
administration and the Chinese populace in Hong Kong is a
'compartmentalisation of the polity and society' in Hong
17
Kong. And such a compartmentalisation (and therefore the
corresponding normative orientations) maintained by two
processes of 'depoliticisation'. On the top, we have
'administrative absorption of politics' on the bottom,
'social accommodation' (Lau, 1982a).
The concept'administrative absorption of politics'
refers to the process of elite-cooptation which forestalls
the rise of counterelites and therefore eliminates potential
threats to the authority of the government. A succint
description of the process and its political significance
has been provided by the original author:
Hong Kong's political stability
in the last hundred years could be
accounted for primarily by the
successful process of the
administrative absorption of
politics. It is a process through
which the British governing elites




attaining an elite integration on
the one hand and a legitimacy of
political authority on the
other......... The ingenuity of
the British governing elites lies
in their sophisticated response in
timely enlarging and modifying the
structure of ruling bodies by
coopting or assimilating emerging
non-British socio-economic elites
into we groups at critical
periods. Consequently, the
development of any strong
counter-elite groups is prevented.
In short, Hong Kong has been
18
governed by an elite consensus or
integration in the last century or
so. (King, 1975:144-145) (3)
However, as Professor King (1975:145) has made it
clear, elite integration could constitute a sufficient
condition for legitimacy of government only in a society in
which the political situation is rather small, and the
political stratum can remain small in Hong Kong only because
of a complementary process: the process of 'social





network at the basic level of
society is able to garner enough
resources to cater to the needs of
the lower strata consequently,
these needs, already limited in
scope by the capability of Chinese
to tolerate need non-satisfaction,
are thus restrained from being
channelised into the political
system for solution. Oftentimes
this basic-level organisational
network is primaryin nature, in
that it consists of small groups
of individuals who engage in
exchange of resources and who are
affectively attached to each
other. (Lau Ho, 1982:184)
Thus, we have now a basic picture of the
social-political system of Hong Kong. In presenting this
picture, I am largely repeating Dr. S.K. Lau's analysis of
Hong Kong, which should be, however, regarded as the
19
culmination of social scientific researches on the social
and political system of Hong Kong. Evaluations of Hong Kong
differ, but few serious and objective analyst would dispute
with the basic contention that, in Hong Kong, a politically.
apathetic society is ruled over by an all-powerful
bureaucracy with the support of (but not necessarily
dependent on) the socio-economic elites (For different
shades of opinion, see Davies, 1977 Harris, 1978 Hong Kong
Research Project, 1974 Rear, 1971). This model, in
effect, constitutes the 'paradigm' for the study of Hong
Kong politics in which every piece of evidence can fit
together.
The problem for us is that, in this basic model of
Hong Kong society, there is no place for our object of stud
--- the political activist groups. There are no social
issues they can work on, no constituency from which they car
draw support, and above all, there are no strata from which
they would emerge (as all potential counter-elites are
individuals isolated from the mainstream of life in Hong
Kong society. But such interpretation would render the
phenomenon that so many of them have emerged in one specific
period of time and received so much public attention very
puzzling. A preliminary attempt to tackle this problem
coopted)--- they can only be groups of idiosyncratic
20
would be the task of the next section.
Structural Origins of Political Activist Groups:
Ways Out of the Puzzle
Given the fact that the political conditions of Hong
Kong depend very much upon factors external to the system,
one plausible reason immediately available to explain the
proliferation of the political activist groups would be that
there are externally induced changes in the political
situation which lead to the differentiation of the elites
and politicization of the masses. This is in fact the most
commonly held conception in Hong Kong.
Such a conception, however, tends to explain the rise
of these groups in terms of 'chance' factors and lose sight
of the endogenous processes of social and political changes.
As Lau (1982a) has repeatedly emphasised, the features of
the social-political system of Hong Kong should be regarded
as outcomes of a specific structural- historical setting,
not, say, the product of some transhistorical cultural
traits of the Chinese, or essential characteristics of
colonial government (4). Then, the social-political system
of Hong Kong and the orientation fo the actors situated in
it should not be something static, and immutable rather,
they should be in a continuous process of change, as things
21
evolve.
Firstly, if we see the tendency of the Hong Kong
Chinese to avoid the polity as characteristic of immigrants
responding to the conditions of a 'temporary station' ruled
by an alien authority following unintelligible codes of
conduct, we can expect the second generation of these
immigrants, who are born, brought up, and educated in Hong
Kong, would develop a different set of orientations to the
social-political system of Hong Kong. For example, they may
have a stronger identification with the system and feel more
competent in demanding something from it. In fact, as early
as 1967, as part of the reflections sparked off by the 1966
riot, a scholar has warned that a 'new generation' with
potential political implications have emerged in Hong Kong
(Jarvie, 1967:361-365).
Moreover, it has been noticed that, in the late 1970s,
'there is an emerging middle-income educated sector which is
increasingly inclined to participate in public
decision-making and which is beginning to be disillusioned
with the responsiveness thus far displayed by the Hong Kong
government' (Lau, 1982a:187). That would mean, there has
developed in Hong Kong, a category of people which does not
fall easily into the categories of elites and masses, and
22
are potential intruders into the political arena.
The potential political stratum, in fact, is not
limited to the middle sector. When he wrote his paper
'Administrative Absorption of Politics' (1975), King has
already argued that the masses would attai9 increasingly
great political significance in a process of social
mobilisation. In more concrete terms, Lau (1982a) observed
that as a result of the enlargement of service-delivery role
of the government and the Chinese society's incapacity to
attend to the needs of the Chinese populace, there has
emerged in Hong Kong a 'new politics' which 'entails an
increase in the level of politicization, gradual
formalization of the relationship between the bureaucracy
and the Chinese society, progressive aggregation of
political demands and growing salience of ideology in
citizen political actions' (Lau, 1983: 556). And the
'compartmentalisation' of the polity and society is
increasingly felt to be intolerable by the Chinese, and to a
lesser extent, by the government, too (Lau, 1982a:148).
Creeping perhaps, there has been a process of
politicization.
Therefore, it can be argued that both 'administrative
absorption' and 'social accommodation of politics' are
23
approaching their limits in the 1980s, and the endogenous
process of changes by itself should generate pressures for
politics outside the bounds of the bureaucracy.
In the later chapters, we would see how these
internally-generated changes are related to the
characteristics and development of the political activist
groups in Hong Kong, and whether these changes, together
with the externally-induced conditions, can adequately
account for the emergence of these groups.
Notes
(1) The term 'dependent polity' is used in the subtitle of
Lau Kuan (1985b).
(2) Hoadley(1971) in his thesis on Hong Kong politics points
out one paradoxical phenomenon: whereas Hong Kong fits well
with Almond Poweell's model of 'pre-mobilised modern
system' by virtue of the smallness of its political stratum,
Hong Kong should be regarded as a 'mobilised system' with
respect to indicators of mobilisation like literacy,
urbanisation, percentage of wage-earners, and
radio-ownership. Moreover, studies of Hong Kong's political
culture reveal that there is an incongruence between the
cognitive and attitudinal dimensions in Hong Kong Chinese's
orientation toward political objects. One possible
explanation is that Hong Kong Chinese are not 'premobilised'
but 'demobilised', a self-imposed stance as a result of laxk
of identification of the society, previous negative
experience with politics, etc.
(3) A descriptive supplement to King's arguments is provided
by Davies(1977), although he prefers to call the system
'class-dominated' rather than 'elite-consensual'.
(4) The social organisation and orientations towards the
'outsideworld' and political authority of the Italian
immigrants living in Boston, for example, are very similar
24
to that of the Hong Kong Chinese, despite the cultural
differences between Italians and Chinese (see Gans, 1962).
It demonstrates that historical-structural factors should




Origin and Development of Political Activist Groups:
A Historical Account
Whereas the approach of the previous chapter, is
Structural, understanding the society and politics of Hong
Kong in terms of the interrelationship among different
?lements, the approach of this chapter would be historical,
and an account of the events, i.e. the interplay of
structure and human action, that have given rise to and
shaped the development of the political activist groups
culd be provided (1). Three interrelated processes are
seen as having contributed to the development of the
Dolitical activist groups: emergence of social movements and
)ressure group politics in Hong Kong, political reforms of
:he Hong Kong government, and the Sino-British negotiation
)n Hong Kong's future and their specific effects would be
inalysed in chronological order in later sections.
Emergence of Internal Politics: 1967-82
The 1967 riot, an extension of the Cultural
Revolution in China to Hong Kong, is the last event before
the Sino-British negotiation on Hong Kong' future that
indicated unambiguously how much the political scene of Hong
26
Kong can be affected by politics in China. The withhold of
support to the local Communists on the part of Peking,
however, signified the Chinese government's pragmatic
approach to Hong Kong, even amidst franatic ideological
fervor, and its tacit endorsement of the status quo of Hong
Kong. And the withdrawal of Peking to the backstage of Hong
Kong politics and the restraint of its agents in Hong Kong
in the 1970s provided a 'space' for the emergence of 'local'
or 'internal' politics and development of non-partisan (with
respect to Peking and Taipei) and non-governmental political
forces in Hong Kong (Lo, 1986). Moreover, the Kowloon riot
a year before showed to the bureaucratic administration of
Hong Kong how frustrations building up on the bottom of the
society can threaten the stability of the system, and in the
later decade, we see the government gradually modify its
approach to the society--- more services are provided, and
more attention paid to its relationship with the public at
large, not just the elites (King, 1975 Kuan, 1979). Thus,
1967 can be regarded as the first 'great divide' in the
post-war political development of Hong Kong.
Behind the spectacular events of 1966 and 1967 was,
however, a more invisible trend of demographic changes. In
the late 1960s, first group of the post-war-born generation
matured into young adulthood. Born and brought up in Hong
27
Kong, these young people have stronger identificationwith
the society and the gradual improvement of life led to
rising expectations--- they began to demand more from the
system (Yeung, 1983). The lower class youth struck out in'
the riot of 1966 (to a lesser extent, 1967, too) their more
well-educated and more privileged counterparts showed their
presence in the student movement.
Student Movement
Signs of increasing social awareness are, in fact,
discernible among the educated young people in the early
1960s. The Post-Secondary Students' Social Service Team
大 專 學 生 社 會 服 務 隊 ) was founded in 1963 and the
Hong Kong University Students' Union established a Current
Affairs Committee under its Council in 1964. There was,
文 社moreover, a proliferation of literary clubs among the
secondary school students, which reflected on one hand a
certain dissatisfaction with the dominant mode of life in
Hong Kong, a life that knew only familistic and material
values, and heightened on the other hand the social and
national consciousness of their participants (2). The
literary clubs gradually disappeared in the late 1960s.
Some of their members, however, entered into universtiy and
became active in the student organisations. And as we would
see later, in the 1980s, they reappeared as organisers of a
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poltical activist group.
The height of the student movement in Hong Kong was
in the early 1970s. The students campaigned for the
recognition of Chinese as an official language, the
protection of the disputed Chinese territories of
Tiao-Yu-Toi Islands, and on behalf of the underprivileged,
notably the blind workers, and the squatter-dwellers. The
movement, however, soon 'internalised' into disputes among
the students over the anti- corruption campaign in 1973, an
almost inevitable consequence of the contradictory status. of
Hong Kong.
Roughly speaking, three broad strains of
orientations can be discerned among the student activists:
the Maoist-nationalist, the neo-leftists, and the liberals.
The Maoist-nationalists identified unquestioningly with
Peking, and saw their main task as preparing Hong Kong for
the eventual return to the Socialist motherland. Their
attitude towards the status quo of Hong Kong was: it was an
necessary though temporary evil. The neo-leftists were more
Hong Kong-oriented and suspected whether Peking was really
practising socialism. They advocated social action and
direct protests against social injustices in Hong Kong. The
liberals upheld the values of liberty, human rights, and
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democracy. They were critical of Peking and mildly
reformist towards Hong Kong.
There was a time sequence of development, too.
Before the Protect Tiao-Yu-Toi Campaign, the dominant
orientation of the student activists was liberal, and the
Chinese nationalism they cherished was primarily cultural,
not political. Partly as an reaction to the high- handed
suppressin of the campaign by the colonial authority, the
students, however, turned more and more radical, i.e.
against the colonial society. In 1973, the differing
orientations of the student activists crystallised into two
facitons: the majority Maoist-nationalist 'Kuo-shui' faction
Best of the Nation') and the action- and theory
oriented Neo-leftist 'She-hui 'Society') minority. And
in 1975, some liberals reemerged in the scene, with the
support of anti-Kuo-shui students, the real majority. After
1977, with the collapse of the dominant Kuo-shui faction,
however, these ideological distinctions lost practical
significance, and on the whole, the student activists became
more and more Hong Kong-oriented, pragmatic, and disposed to
striving for concrete, piece-meal improvements, and, in
effect, the student organisations merged into the developing




These different ideological orientations and their
succession are worth noting for they were reflected in the
different orientations of the political activists, our focus
of study. Moreover, the emergence and decline of these
orientations reflected the dilemmas faced by any movement
not satisfied with seeking piece-meal changes of mundane
conditions in Hong Kong. A student activist made such a
summary of the dilemmas before them in 1973:
ro love China, and continue the
Spirit of the student movement
3eveloped since May Fourth--- but
There lie our roots? To oppose
:he colonial government, and
?liminate oppression and
?xploitation--- but what is our
3irection? Patriotism and to
Learn about China,
anti-colonialism and social
reforms--- what should we do
about them? (Far Eastern Affairs
-ommentators, 1982: 218-219)
These problems were disturbing because the status
quo of this corrupt colony of Hong Kong was endorsed by the
Socialist China they wished to know and love, but were
segregated from and understood so little. The solution of
the Kuo-shui faction was to follow closely the policies of
the Peking regime and wait patiently for the coming of the
'ideal society'. But the appeal of such an option rapidly
evaporated with the exposure of the dark sides of China
after 1976. Students of She-hui orientation advocated
action against the injustices of Hong Kong society, but they
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could not solve the problem as to what should
'anti-colonialism' in Hong Kong lead to if-they would not
accept a simple merge with China, not to say that their
critiques of colonialism and neo-capitalism were scarcely
understood by the people of Hong Kong. As for the liberals,
their values were too close to the dominant institutions and
the great majority of them were therefore easily absorbed by
the society.
From the outset, the student movement of Hong Kong
is a 'movement in search of a direction', and have had,
after 1973, limited impact on the wider society. It has,
however, served to stimulate young Hong Kong intellectuals'
reflections on their own social situation, and led to the
institutionalization of an 'idealistic subculture' around
the student organisations of the Post-secondary educational
instituions, heightening therefore the social and political
consciousness of a segment of the educated, middle class in
Hong Kong. Three former student activists, for example,
have such a conclusion on the impact of the student movement
on their own development:
Perhaps, the practice of the
student movement in the 70s has
not solved any theoretical problem
for us. But that as young
intellectuals we can no longer
stay in the small circles of the
individual is a precious lesson we
learn with blood, sweat, and
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inestimable amount of energy. (4)
Some of these student activists later became
organisers of 'pressure groups' and we can detect the shadow
of the student movement among the political activist groups
that emerged in the early 1980s.
Pressure Group Politics
The term 'oressure group' has a special meaning in
Hong Kong. It refers to groups which are in different
degrees opposed to the government and rely primarily on
publicity campaign to seek their desired changes in
government decisions. Four different types of them can be
identified: a) unions of public-service workers and semi-
professionals, b) community organisations, c) advocacy
groups on educational reforms, labour welfare,etc and d)
opinion groups on general issues (Yeunc, 1985b).
Usually founded in the early and mid 70s, these
groups gained increasing prominence in the latter half of
the 70s, and they constituted the backbone of the then
developing 'Struggle For Entitled Right Movements'
爭 取 權 益 運 動 ). Their emergence reflected on one
hand the general growth of secondary, associational groups
in Hong Kong (Lee, 1982:51-55), and on the other hand, the
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increasing importance of government's action in the everyday
life of the citizens.
With the exception of the Hong Kong Observers which-
can be taken as the predecessor of the political activist
groups emerged in the 80s, these pressure croups tend to
concentrate on narrow, particular, and concr_e:e issu:es,'and
deliberately maintain a low political tone. In he late
1970s, however, they gradually elevated their level of
concern from isolated issues to general policy, and in the
early 1980s, we began to hear about demands for more
popular participation in various areas of public policies,
notably housing and education. A milestone of the
development of the pressure groups was the Campaign =against
Increase in Bus-Fare in 1981. In this incide-.t, the
pressure groups joined together on one general issue, and
there emerged a scenerio of a united front of p:li,tical
forces that -tand for middle and lower class interests in
Hong Kong, a scenerio seemed increasingly likely with the
further cooperation of the pressure groups in the Campaign
Against Increase in Electricity Charges and the 'Joint
Committee for the Supervision of the Public Utilities'
though a recognized leadership and（ 各 監 管 公 共 事 業 聯 委 會 ）
a permanant nucleus organization for joint action had not
yet emerged. Themselves a product of the government
34
bureaucrats' more tolerant and conciliatory policies towards
critics and protestants, these groups have helped to create
a more tolerant political culture among the public as they
are increasingly accustomed to open criticism of and
challenges to the government authority (Lau Kuan, 1985a).
However, their political stand, even with reference to the
internal social forces of Hong Kong, is quite ambiguous.
Vaguely, they stand for the interests of the middle and
lower classes, but that 'middle and lower classes' is not
well-defined, not to say their interests.(5)
In a nutshell, in the early 1980s, in embryonic
form, a local 'third political force' is emerging in Hong
Kong, but before it can crystallise into any concrete form,
the Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future
fundamentally altered the conditions of the political game.
Changes with far-reaching consequences were
introduced, in fact, before the negotiation began. In 1982,
District Boards with one-third of their members directly
elected by all people over 21 in age and having lived in
Hong Kong for more than 7 years were established in the 18
administrative districts of Hong Kong. These District
Boards are primarily advisory bodies with very limited
discretionary power, but the changes marked the introduction
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of election by universal suffrage in Hong Kong. Originally
presented as a measure to solve mundane.problems, these
'administrative' reforms became the first step in the
'planned democratisation' of Hong Kong which was closely
related to the issue of Hong'Kong's constitutional future.
And the District Boards later became the first points of
entry of the political activist groups into the existing
political institutions, and the elections events of
widespread political mobilisation.
The Issue of Hong Kong's Future and the Rise of the
Political Activist Groups in Hong Kong
Approaching late 1970s, the expiry of the leasehold
of the New Territories in 1997 became an increasingly
pressing problem for the British government and the business
community of Hong Kong. And in 1982, the Chinese government
consented to negotiate with the British on the
constitutional future of Hong Kong. The Sino-British
negotiations on Hong Kong's future marked the re-entry of
China into the front stage of Hong Kong politics and ushered
in a host of novel changes in the political scene of Hong
Kong--- one of which is the proliferation of political
activist groups.
While the emergence and development of the political
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activist groups have been intimately related to the
Sino-British negotiations on Hong Kong's future and
connected developments, we should note, however, that the
formation of some of these groups predated the emergence of
'Hong Kong's future' as the dominant political issue and
they were initially oriented to other social issues. The
Hong Kong Observers, a middle-class opinion group, which
shared many characteristics of the political groups that
emerged in the early 1980s, was formed in 1975 and acted
primarily as a liberal social critic. The Society for
Social Research was formed in 1981 to research on problems
related to various public policies. The Meeting Point was
first organised as a forum to discuss the 'youth problem' in
Hong Kong in 1982, and the first activity of the Hong Kong
Policy Viewer was to study the Urban Council Election in
1983.
Nonetheless, the political circumstances created by
the Sino- British negotiations on Hong Kong's future and the
settlements reached have been the primary stimulant to and
shaping force of the development of the political groups.For
heuristic purpose, I would divide in the following passages
the development of the groups into several phases, and show
how different phases of development of the political
activist groups can be related to the development of the
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political circumstances created by the negotiaiton on and
arrangements for Hong Kong's future.
First Phase: Sudden Emergence of Space---
Idealists responding to historical opportunity
The Sino-British negotiation began in an uneasy
climate of confrontation in late 1982. Whereas the Chinese
government insisted from the very beginning the sovereignty
of Hong Kong belonged to China and must be resumed on or
before 1997, the British wished to maintain, through one way
or another, a continuing 'official British link' in Hong
Kong after 1997. To strengthen their positions in the
negotiation, both sides tried to enlist the support of the
Hong Kong people, and a 'battle for public opinion' ensued.
As both the Chinese and British (Hong Kong) governments
would like to cultivate as much support as possible and
China, while insisting on the resumption of sovereignty,
apparently did not have a detailed blueprint for the future
political arrangements of Hong Kong, a golden opportunity
for a third political force oriented to changing the status
quo of Hong Kong seemed to have been created.
The existing pressure groups, however, were not
prepared to make use of the opportunity: firstly, they were
primarily interest groups seeking piece-meal improvements of
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the conditions of their members and supporters or groups
concentrating on one policy area, and little idea on the
overall future direction of Hong Kong secondly, the issue
of Hong Kong's constitutional future was too controversial
and sensitive and would probably divide their supporters if
the leaders declared a clear stand- given the conflicting
appeals of nationalism and pragmatism, as well as the
pressure groups' critical stance towards the Hong Kong
government, a non-controversial stand would virtually be
impossible. The pressure groups, therefore, maintained
silence throughout the disputes over the 'sovereignty
problem'.
It were the intellectuals that came up for the
challenges(6). First, it was not quite correct to say that
all the pressure groups formed in the 70s had kept quiet on
the issue of Hong Kong's future. Two middle-class opinion
groups, Hong Kong Belongers and Hong Kong Observers, had
voiced out their views in the early phase of the emergence
of the issue as a public concern. While the Belongers were
in favour of preserving as much of the status quo as
possible, the Observers, younger and more liberal in
orientation, asked for autonomy within China and a more open
and representative government, foreshadowing what are to be
demanded by the political activist groups later. There were
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also groups formed specifically for the issue, notably the
Hong Kong Prospect Institute (Cheng, .1984a: 116-120,
124-129).
It is, however, the 'Democratic Reformist
（ 民 主 改 革 派 ） groups that were to have a more
significant role to play and worth our special attention
here. The slogan of the 'democratic reformists' was
'Democratic Reforms and Return to China'. The return of
Hong Kong's sovereignty to China, it was agrued, was not
only required by nationalist principles, but was also 'an
opportunity provided by history' for democratisation and
socio- economic reforms in Hong Kong which, in turn, might
stimulate the democratisation of China.
This strand of thought was first given publicity by
some columists in the early 80s, but its origin can be
traced back to the student movement of the 70s(7). An
ex-student activist, a leading figure of the she-hui
faction, articulated such a view in a speech in 1975:
In Hong Kong, the goal of
anti-colonialism should be
reunification with China, and that
of anti-capitalism should be to
merge into the democratisation
movement in China.......... When
the conditions of' ideology and
hold of real power are ripe, we
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should mobilize the masses, and
initiate the slogan of
'reunification with China'.
(Tsang, 1979:64).
Such a plea had to be a cry in the void in the 70s,
and would be taken seriously only by a small group of
radical intellectuals, idealists in an ideal-less society.
As a result of the political circumstances created by'the
Sino-British negotiation on HOng Kong's future, in the early
80s, however, there seemed to be some chance of success for
the partial realisation of their long frustrated youthful
ideals--- a space suddenly emerged so that there was at
least something for them to do. 'Hong Kong has gone into a
dead alley, but now there can be a way out'--- a
sympathetic but more pessimistic journalist thus described
the reason for their excitement (Ng Mak-yin, H.K.Econ.J'.1
Monthly, Dec., 1982:16).
A systematic presentation of the views of the
'democratic reformists' was attempted in the 'Proposals for
the Future of Hong Kong' announced by the Meeting Point
when it was formally founded in January, 1983. Founded in
approximately the same time was New Hong Kong Society,
another body of democratic reformists. While supporting the
resumption of sovereignty of Hong Kong by China, both groups
asked for an elected government as well as social and
economic reforms--- a much watered-downed version of the
original ideals of the she-hui faction. -Their views are
echoed by the activists of the students' unions of the two
universities in Hong Kong, and in the hands of these young
idealists, 'high degree of. self-administration'
( 高 度 自 治 ） and 'Hong Kong governed by Hong Kong People'
（ 港 人 活 港 promised by the Chinese leaders became
'Democratic self-administration' （ 民 主 自 治 and 'Hong Konc
governed by Hong Kong people democratically',
The term 'Min-zhu（ 港 人 民 主 治 港 meaninc
（ 民 主
'democracy' was inserted whenever it was possible. Thus,
there emerged a third strand of political opinion in Hong
Kong--- pro-China in principle, these activists pressed for
something the Chinese leaders might not be so willing to
grant.
As the British were in the upper hand in the battle
for public support in Hong Kong, however, the Chinese
leaders could not afford to alienate any section of public
opinion that supported their position of resuming the
sovereignty of Hong Kong, and adopting the classical Maoist
strategy of 'united front', they tried to cultivate these
groups of democratic reformists. Xu Jia-tun, Director of
New China News Agency, official representative of Peking in
Hong Kong, for example, appeared in the first anniversary
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ceremony of the Meeting Point, and in his first public
speech on Hong Kong's future in Hong Kong,.Xu praised the
patriotism of the young intellectuals in Hong Kong
promised a significant role for the intellectuals in the
future 'Hong Kong Governed by Hong Kong People', and urged
them to come forward to support the cause of reunification
with China (H.K.Econ. J'l Monthly Feb., 1884).
Never had been a time in Hong Kong's history that
intellectuals appeared so important and in 1983 and 1984, we
saw many small groups formed among the young college
graduates and students to study various social and political
issues. Not all of them got formally registered: some were
nothing more than small discussion groups and some
disappeared after presenting an article in the press.
Standing out among these groups was the Hong Kong
Affairs Society formed in February, 1984 which was composed
of older and more established professionals. Whereas the
early groups were formed mainly by peripheral intellectuals
and young graduates in an early stage of their personal
careers(8), people in a certain sense not fully
participating in the society, the appearance of the Hong
Kong Affairs Society marked the entry of the upper-middle
class in the political scene.
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SeocndPhase: Decolonisation beganFromOpinion to Electoral Groups
Information that the British has yielded to Peking's
position on the 'sovereignty' issue and that the Hong Kong
government was considering opening the Legislative Council
to elections circulated widely in early 1984. And political
commentators were quick to note that decolonisation
involving the development of representative government had
begun in Hong Kong and could be dated back to the
introduction of district boards with directly elected
members in 1980. The remaining doubts were cast out by the
announcementof Howe, the British Foreign Minister, in Hong
Kong after his visit to Peking, who declared it unrealistic
to wish for the continuation of British administration in
Hong Kong after 1997 and :hat the Hong Kong government would
develop towards the direction of a more representative
system.
That there would be a process of democratisation
planned from above was thus clear to all. From then on what
poliitical reforms should be introduced to Hong Kong
replaced the 'sovereignty problem' as the dominant political
issue in Hong Kong and the political activist groups began
considering to support candidates in the coming elections to
the District Board and Urban Council. Organisation of new
From Opinion to Electoral Groups
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groups aiming at elections started and the existing groups,
notably the Meeting Point, took steps to strengthen their
organisation. Preparation for the future 'Hong Kong
governed by Hong Kong-people' began earnestly.
In July 1984, two months before the draft
Sino-British Joint- Delaration on Hong Kong's future was
signed, the Hong Kong government issued a Green Paper on the
development of representative government. In this proposal
for political reforms, indirect elections to the Legislative
Council through 'functional constituencies' made up of
professional bodies, business organisations, etc, and
electoral colleges formed by members of the District Boards
are provided, but not direct elections (H.K. Govt., July,
1984).
In response to the Green Paper, 49 bodies, including
the political activist groups and the pressure groups formed
in 70s, formed into a 'Joint Conference for the Study of the
Green Paper on Representative Government' 各 界 研 討 代 議
and they organised a mass制 綠 皮 書 聯 席 會 議
rally in September 1984 in which a declaration demanding
direct elections to not less than one-fifth of the seats in
the Legislative Council signed by 89 bodies was presented.
This marked the first attempt by the political activist
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groups to collaborate with each other and other 'pressure
groups' in Hong Kong.
The White Paper, the final decisions on political
reforms issued in November 1984, had not provided for direct
elections, but it was widely believed at that time that
direct elections to the Legislative Council would' be
introduced in 1988. At about the same time people debated
on the Green Paper, arguments in favour of a party that can
coordinate and balance all interests in Hong Kong appeared
and these were taken to be arguments for a 'dominant party
system' following the model of Singapore.
The would-be 'dominant party', it was then believed,
was the 'Hong Kong People's Association'
founded in November 1984 by a group of established
academics, professionals, and senior executives, people seen
publicly as close to the bureaucratic administration
ideologically and socially. The Hong Kong People's
Association turned out to less ambitious than it was thought
to be but its significance lay on being the first group
formed by elites close to the core values and institutions
of Hong Kong society a group whose main intent apparently
was to preserve the virtues of, rather reform the
injustices, of the existing system.
46
An event that can be seen as the culmination of the
development in this phase and marked a significant advance
of the political activist groups in participating in the
political system- an advance beyond the role of
commentators- was the District Board election in March
1985. In this 'warming-up race for governing Hong Kong', 6
of the political activist groups formed in the 80s 'had
members running as candidates in the election and the
success rate of these candidates was remarkably 100%, and
the number of votes they obtained was also very impressive
(Focus, Mar. 9, 1985:21). What triumphed here, however,
were the young and educated, rather than the political
activist croucs. Predominant majority of the candidates ran
as individual rather than members of the groups and their
membership in the political activist groups did not stand
out in the election campaigns (25). While some groups had
played a significant role in recruiting the volunteers and
organising the election campaigns, the support provided by
the political groups, in general, was not an important
factor of Success.
Nonetheless, the election served as a boost to the
prestige of these political activist groups and the newly
acquired status of district board members allowed members of
these groups to build up ties with the local populace, the
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grassroots.
Third Phase: Filling the Vacuum--- Race to Inherit Power
This phase began with the emergence of the
Progressive Hong Kong Society, the first group that seemed
to command the resources to become a ruling political party,
and it was the period that we heard most about forminc
political parties in Hong Kong.
The formation of the Progressive-Hong Kona Society
was formally announced in March 1985, after the District
Board Election was held. What set the group apart from
other political organisations were first that its chairman,
who almost personified the group, was an appointed
unofficial member of both the Executive and Legislative
Councils, who is also elected member of the Urban Council
and therefore, ex-officio member of a district board--- the
only person that has participated in all the four 'tiers' of
the political institutions in Hong Kong. Secondly, perhaps
more importantly, the group has, among its founders, members
of 6 very rich families in Hong Kong and is known to be
supported financially by these families.
Although the declared aim of the Progressive Hong
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Kong Society was to build up a cross-class organisation
which can coordinate the interests of different social
strata and included among its founding memberM leaders of
unions and 'pressure- groups', it is widely seen as the
first attempt of the elites of Hong Kong to organise
themselves politically, in face of the coming transition of
power.
The foundation of the Progressive Hong Kong Society
spurred other groups of people into action. Firstly,
another appointed unofficial member of Legislative Council,
Allen Lee, announced publicly an ambitious plan to form a
'political party', that would have a membership of twenty
thousand and a definite platform, to take part in the coming
direct elections to the Legislative Council. Collaborating
closely with him was a number of younger unofficial members
of the Legislative Council. And behind them, it was
believed, were the more senior figures.
There thus occurred an interesting situation in
which there were two elite political groups in latent
competition: one still-born, but sounded ambitious and
aggressive, the other, formally founded, got no definite
stand on any issue, consistently denied even the ambition to
become a political party, but concentrated on aggrandizing
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its organisation silently.
Another group of people that responded to the
challenge of the Progressive Hong Kong Society were leaders
of the 'pressure groups'. A group of 'pressure group'
leaders, social workers and other individuals, most of them
church-related, had come together and considered the
formation of a political group in as early as 1984. Seeing
what they sensed as a process of political organisation from
above, they hastened to form the Association for Democracy
and Public Justice on July, 1985 which championed explicitly
the interests of the lower classes, ostensibly as a
countervailing power to the elite ar_ouos.
And in as early as late 1984, three small political
groups the Hong Kong Policy Viewer, New Hong Kong Society,
and Society for Social Research, and a neighbourhood
organisation organised around Urban Councillors and district
board members with 'pressure group' background, Sham-Shui-Po
People's Livelihood Concern Group began to discuss on the
possibility of collaborating their forces to form a larger
organisation. They were later joined by the Association for
Democracy and Public Justice, other political groups of
reformist orientations, and several 'offices' of distric
board members, and in around mid-1985, we began to hear
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about the formation of a 'grassroots party'.
Formation of political parties was so much in vague
in mid- and late-1985 that we heard even of the plan to form
a pro-Peking political party.
Among those politically active, the general feeling
was that an effective organisation was mandatory for anybody
who would like to have a position in the political
institution, or influence the political process.
If the number of press reports is a valid indicator,
it was the time that political activist groups received the
most public attention and this period can, in fact, be
characterised as a climax of the development of the
political activist groups in Hong Kong. But the continued
development of these groups made sense only if there would
be significant power to be inherited or shared in Hong Kong
--- judging from the low-profile strategy of the Progressive
Hong Kong Society, and the wait-and-see attitude of Allen
Lee, the political activists were not quite sure about that
even in this period of relative optimism.
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Fourth Phase: Limits Exposed--- Withdrawal or Organisational
Consolidation
This phase began roughly in late 1985 and continued
till now. From July 1985 onwards, the Chinese leaders,
directly and indirectly., disclosed their reservations
towards political reforms in Hong Kong, and by late 1985, it
was clear that Peking would not tolerate forces independent
of its control to take over Hong Kong from the British---
to develop an 'inheritance party' would be a very
impractical line of thought.
Under these circumstances, Allen Lee declared in
January 1986 the abandonment of his plan to form a political
party, the reason being that there would be no power to take
for the party. The Progressive Hong Kong Society, on the
other hand, showed no significant development one year after
it was formed, and was quite inactive, at least in the
public.
While the elites have given up the attempt to be the
'Hong Kong People' that 'govern Hong Kong', the more modest
middle-class reformist groups which wish at most to occupy
more positions the political institutions to enhance their
influence and image rather than to inherit power move on.
The Meeting Point is beginning to build up ties with
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residents in different localities, the attempt to combine
forces on the part of several small groups culminated in the
formation of Association for Democracy and People's
Livelihood, and the Hong Kong Affairs Society, has also
shown signs of more active participation in the political
scene. Without high hopes and acutely aware of the
uncertainties ahead, these groups prepare themselves quietly
for the changes that may come.
Notes
(1) Two 'political groups', Reform Club and Civic
Association, were formed in the early 50s. But they were
known to be lacking dynamism and political significance (see
Hoadley,1973 King, 1975). As the interest of the present
study is on a historal phenomenon, the political groups
profilerated in the 1980s, they would not be considered
here.
(2) See the reports of interview with Chan Yuen-ying on Wide
Angle, July 6, 1985 and Man Sai-Cheong on H.K. Economic
Journal, Dec. 2, 1985 (in Chinese).
(3) See the collection of commentaries and original
documents in Far Eastern Affairs Commentators(1982) and Hong
Kong Federation of Students(1983).
(4) Quoted from Lo Chi-kin, Ma Fung-kwok, Cheung Shui-lam,
'The Present, Past,and Futureof Student Movement',a paper
presented in the Twenty-secondAnnual Meeting of the H.K.
Federation of Students in 1981 (original Chinese).
(5) For information about 'pressure groups' and citizen
movements see Cheng(1984a, 1984b), Lui(1984), Yeung(1983)
and 'Special Issue on Pressure Groups', H.K. Economic
Journal Monthly, July, 1981.
(6)'Intellectuals' in a loose sense refers to educated
people. But the term implies also a special interest in
reasoning and abstraction.
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(7) For a collection of representative articles sharing the
'democratic reformist' stand, see Tsang et.al. (1982).
(8)'Peripheral intellectuals' refer to those intellectuals




The Groups, The Activists, and The System: An Overview
Having outlined a basic picture of the socio-political
system of Hong Kong, and traced the events that shaped the
development of the political activist groups, I would
attempt in this chapter to give a closer look at the groups,
their participants, and how they see their own situation and
behave in Hong Kong.
Social Bases
Members of political activist groups in Hong among are
distinguished by their age and education. Although no
systematic survey has been carried out, it is generally
observed that a predominant majority of them are belo..' forty
in age and have received higher education. And consistent
with their education. they are usually professionals and
semi-professionals.
As a rule, these people have been active when they
55
were students, although not all of them have been strictly
speaking particiapants in the student movement in Hong Kong.
And almost invariably these groups were founded by people
who have maintained ties in friendship networks formed in
school days, giving many of the groups an old-boy
association like character, and we can identify these groups
with connections formed when they were students. To quote a
few examples: the members of the first session of the Hong
Kong People's Association predominantly graduated from the
University of Hong Kong in 1969 and had been active in the
student organisations of the University founders of Meetinc
Point were members of the She-hui faction of student
activists in early and mid 70s members of Society for
Social Research were the executives of the Hong Kong
University Students' Union in the late 70s and early 80s
founders of the New Hong Kong Society predominantly
graduated from the Chinese Universtiy in the early 80s, etc.
As these groups expand, they gradually recruit in
other categories of people: pressure group leaders (who may
also be ex-student-activists), district board members, local
community leaders, and individuals interested in their
activities for various reasons. Still, they are primarily
groups of young, educated middle class.
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The only two groups that fall outside this pattern
are, perhaps, progressive Hong Kong Society, which attempts
to be a 'cross-class' organisation, and Association for
Democracy and Public Justice, formed by pressure group
leaders and other church-related individuals.
Organisation
The political activist groups formed in the 80s are
all small organisations, in terms of number of members. The
largest group is Meeting Point which claim to have 300
members, but according to one informant, only 30 to 40 of
them are active. The smaller groups usually have 20 to 30
members, and what are active may just be a handful of
individuals.
Typically, these political groups would have an
elected executive committee, and several committees-divided
according to policy areas to study different social and
political issues. The larger groups would have also a
council above the executive committee.
More important, perhaps, is the informal structure,
while the smaller groups are basically 'peer group'
organisations, the larger groups, it is observed, is being
divided into concentric circles of different degree of
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commitment and activity, which entails inevitably an
oligarchic tendency. And aside from commitment to the goals
of the organisations, personal relationship seems to be an
important basis of the'solidarity of the groups, especially
the smaller ones.
One sign of the underdevelopment of the organisation
of these groups is that views of their leaders or outspoken
members are not usually differentiated from those of the
organisation. If fact, the majority of the groups do not
seem to have developed among their members coherent set of
views, besides some vague, general orientations, and do not
have, therefore, 'official lines'.
Ideology
One striking characteristic of the political activist
groups is their outward similarity in political stands. All
have adopted a cautious and moderate tone and none would
dispute the primary importance of 'stability and
prosperity'. Upon closer analysis, however, we can detect
subtle differences in their orientations.
Three main lines of distinction can be identified:
degree of acceptance of the Chinese government, attitudes
toward 'democratisation', and attitudes toward social
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welfare
The soverignty issue is now settled. Everybody knows
that they have to work within the framework of 'one country
two systems', and all agree that 'a high level of autonomy'
is essential to the future 'special administrative zone of
Hong Kong'. Differences in degree of acceptance of the
Chinese government, therefore, exists now in latent rather
than manifest private, psychologicl, rather than
organisational, policy level. Therefore, it is not very
meaningful to classify the groups according to this line,
though some groups seem to have shown a more conciliatory
stand towards China. A more useful way is to classify them
along the two axes of 'support for democratisation' and
'social welfare'.
To differentiate the positions-of the groups along the
lines of degree of support for democratisation, however,
would not be a straightforward matter. None are explicitly
against democratic reforms and none have advocated
'overnight democratisation'. The difference is just between
groups that have campaigned actively for democracy and
groups that have members publicly expressed reservations
towards a democratisation too rapid, and the arguments are
essentially over how far and how fast democratic reforms
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should be introduced. Democratisaton, however, may be
supported for different reasons. While some argue primarily
in terms of what are functionally required by the transition
of power, others have expressed a desire to bring in
contervailing power in a system dominated by bureaucrats.
What are heard in public, however, is predominantly the
milder, more moderate former position.
Distinctions in position towards social welfare are a
bit easier to discern. We have groups that favour a 'more
reasonable distribution of resources', i.e. mild
redistributionist measures, and those apparently do not
regard the 'distribution of resources' as an important
problem. Those who are in favour of more social welfare
measures, however, tend not to emphasise this facet of their
position in public, and their demands for socio-economic
reforms exist primarily on paper, not in deeds. A casual
observer, therefore, could hardly discern any ideological
difference among the political groups in Hong Kong. The most
obvious indicator is perhaps, how far the groups are
oriented to build up ties with the masses, but there is also
a group ostensibly not 'welfarist' but claim to
'cross-class'.
As a kind of 'ideal-type' construction, however, we
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can differentiate between a 'liberal' and a 'social
democrat' position. For a 'liberal', the i.deal society is
open, pluralistic, and one that rewards merits, and they are
basically identified with the present system of Hong Kong
and their main intent is to preserve the existing virtues of
Hong Kong. The 'social democrat', on the other hand, while
agreeing with the liberals on the virtues of an open society
and recognising the necessity of preserving the basic
socio-economic framework of Hong Kong, would like to see it
become economically more equitable, and to coin the term
usaually used in Hong Kong, more 'grassroots-oriented'. The
liberals, moreover, can be further differentiated into
those who are relatively optimistic and those pessimistic.
Those optimistic tend to have more faith on the rationality
of the masses and are therefore in favour of more rapid
political reforms. Those who are pessimistic, however, in
principle not against political reforms, however, have
emphasised caution.
The line between 'liberal' and 'social democrat'.
however, is very thin. And as has been observed, the
majority of the political groupos in Hong Kong have not
developed a coherent set of political views, and their
ideologies, more often than not, exist as some vague,
general orientations rather than explicitly defined official
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standpoints. The politicisation of Hong Kong, we should also
note, has not been to the extent that. we would find
political activist groups made up of people exclusively of
one ideological orientation, and anyone who tries seriously
to divide these groups into clear ideological camps would
face difficulties. In fact, there is one orientation that I
have left out in the above discussions: the 'obscure'.
Individual Motivations
Motivations are always difficult to gauge and we
cannot expect people to be completely frank in telling us
why they take part in political activities. But through the
observation of their behaviour, analysis of the objective
situation, and the explicit statements made, we may be able
to arrive at an understanding of what have motivated people
to participate in political activist croups.
First, there are those people who think that they were
working for some altruistic goals, making contributions to
Hong Kong society and/or the future development of China.
They are, in short, the idealists.
Idealists, however, differ in their degree of
committment, and are not necessarily people that would
devote to their cause at all costs, Mr. Lau Nai-Keung,
chairman of the Meeting Pont, for example, explained why he
became active in in politics, by the view that a historical
opportunity has been created, with which middle class
intellectuals can affect the future development of Hong Kong
and China, 'without great sacrifices and paying high
costs'(Wide Angle, Aug. 16, 1986:22). And a columnist, who
is also a member of Meeting Point, lamented the fact that
members of the group while willing to give up their leisure
time, are afraid of exposing themselves in public (Chan
Hong, Economic J'l Daily, July 1, 1985). Similar complaints
have been raised by Mr. Chang Ka-Mun, president of the New
Hong Kong Society and he explained it in terms if the
groups' members' career considerations (Lai Tak Youth
Centre, 1985). 'Without great sacrifices', it seems, is
important for the more idealistic people of Hong Kong to
involve in politics.
There are, however, also individuals that appeared to
have a stronger sense of moral conviction. In a statement
presenting herself to the 'Joint Conference of Political
Opinion Groups on Basic Law' in competition for a position
in the Basic Law Consultative Committee, the representative
of the Association for Democracy and Public Justice
expressed her motivations for participation as such:
After conflicts between my reason
and emotions, I have decided to be
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a person that has the courage to
speak up honestly, although I may
have to pay for it....At this time
of big exchanges of 'power' and
'interests', I see many people
changing, compromising..... I hope
myself, guided by my convictions
and with the encouragement of
friends from different sectors,
can preserve an unchanging heart
of service in this changing
environment. 'Not to be moved by
wealth and elevation of status,
not to bow before might and
violence'.
How far the 'heroism' and 'emotivity' expressed by
these statements are representative among the political
activists, I have no way to tell. But as a general
impression, the great majority tend to be cool-headed
people. Afterall, up to now, the tests before them, if
there have been any, are not that severe.
More characteristic of their lines of thinking may be
the following opinion:
The degree and scope of
democratic reforms in Hong Kong
are subject to limits. Therefore,
the risks and costs for the the
participants are also
correspondingly reduced..... It
does not require special gifts to
participate in such an interesting
game. The younger generation of
Hong Kong have never had a chance
to show their talents and realise
their ambitions. It is completely
comprehensible that they are so
eager to try. (Tsang, S.K.,
Economic J'1 Daily, Aug. 16, 1985)
64
But then the participants may have a certain
opportunistic character, and objectively the political
groups may be instrumental to individual announcement. Some
individuals, indeed, are.seen as building up a political
career with the help of the political groups.While there may
be people who are unquestionably idealistic or
opportunistic, the line between opportunists and idealists,
however, is not hard and fast. People true to their higher
values may appear opportunistic sometimes as they have to
adapt themselves to an external reality while those
opportunistic may appear more and more idealistic
embittered by denial of opportunities. Human motivations,
above all, are complicated and fluid.
Both 'idealistic' and 'opportunistic', however, woul
not be very appropriate to characterise the motivations o
participants aho are not particulatrly committed to th
groups-- people who came up cccasionaly in their seminar o.
study groups, and help out for one or two nights ii
electoral campaigns. 'For me, it is a life-style', one o:
my friends who has joined a political group remarked, 'an(
it allows me contact with the wider society'. Most of the
groups, we should also not forget, have at its core persona=
networks, and con therefore be emotionally gratifying it
ways quite unrelated to their social and political roles.
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Some, it has been observed, joined the groups simply to know
more people, or even to establish business connections.
Definition of Self and Situation
This section deals with how the political activists it
Hong Kong see themselves, assess the socio-political
situation, and define their role as political actors
accordingly. The political groups and activists in Hong
Kong differ in their degree of articulation. There are
considerable variations in views, and their assessment of
the situation changes with the development of the political
circumstances. Minding these, and without doing full
justice to the richness of their arguments, however, we can
still identify a general set of views with which they give
meaning to their situation and what they are doing.
Let us begin with their self-identity. With
differences across groups and individuals in relative
emphasis which reflect differences in ideological
orientations and social stations, four elements predominate
in the self-concept of the political activists: (1) A new,
younger generation of Hong Kong people, (2) Middle Class,
(3) Intellectuals, and (4) Professionals.
The 'New Generation' identity indicates a growing
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identification with and sense of responsibility towards Hong
Kong, and carries sometimes also the connotation they are
the more enlightened, forward-looking, and dynamic people,
as distinct from the conservative 'sojourners' of an earlier
generation. 'Middle Class' implies their sense of belonging
to a stratum distinct from the rich and the poor in terms of
life-style and life-chances, people with status elevated
above the masses but not having the same vested interests in
the status quo as the rich. Both 'professionals' and
'intellectuals' carry the meaning of 'men of knowledge'.
The term 'professional', however, has the connotations of
being functionally improtant and technically indispensable,
while the term 'intellectual' implies a broader concern,
certain idealism, and a sense of special social and
political mission.
In short, the political activists see. themselves a.c
people that have a sense of devotion tc Hong Kong society,
possess certain special competence, and should have,
therefore, an obligation to take part in the making of a
better Hong Kong.
This sense of obligation to among Kong is given
specific meaning by their assessment of the social and
political situation of Hong Kong and lead to their
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self-definition as 'social commentator' and 'critics' on one
hand, and 'promoters of political participation' on the
other hand.
The formation of groups of social commentators and
critics are seen as required by the need to give informed
opinion on various public issues, particularly public
policies that are increasingly important to the life of Hong
Kong people as the society develops, and the general need to
supervise the bureacrats, and is, therefore, not necessarily
related to the emergence of HongKong's future as a political
issue.
The changes associated with the arrangements for Hong
Kong's future, however, have provided these groups with some
special tasks: to voice their opinion on the design for Hong
Kong's future, to promote political reforms, and to
supervise the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities in their job
of developing a new constitutional framework for Hong Kong.
with a few exceptions that have an obscure position
the political activist groups, it has been noted above,
stand generally for democratic reforms. One common piece of
argument shared by them is that a certain degree of
democratisation is necessitated by the transition of power
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to fill the vacuum of authority created by the evacuation of
the Brithi.sh and a significant element of direct, open
election is indispensable if Hong Kong is to have a
legitimate and autonomous government. The issue of Hong
Kong's future, some would add, has resulted in unprecedented
politicisation in Hong Kong, and the people of Hong Kong
are, therefore, more ready for political reforms than-
before.
None, however, think that conditions in Hong Kong are
completely ripe for a full-blown democractisation with the
political leaders directly elected in a 'one person one
vote' system. They see their tasks as therfore to create
more favourbale conditions for democratisation: to foster
the development of political talents, and*to develop among
the masses a more mature civic culture. And the
participation of the political groups in elections to
different political bodies, it is argued, would serve both
purposes.
The political activist, however, are aware that
impetus to change in Hong Kong comes not from below but they
are at best junior partners. They must play the game
according to rules set by others, they invariably admitted,
and they connot even set the agenda of discussion as they
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like. Members of Meeting Point have a phrase to
characterise the limited goals they can have: 'reforms
within a cage' （ 烏 龍 改 革 ） The cage is the framwork of
Hong Kong as a 'Speical Administrative Zone of China'. And
how much space would be available within this cage can be
known only after the Chinese leaders disclosed their
decisions. While some have produced various political and
economic arguments to show that there should be space
available, for others, the point is just not to give up
before the situation is unmistakably hopeless.
Not all political groups, however, are reform-oriented
or active as commentators. The stated goal of one group,
for example, is just to provide a link among different
sectors in society, while the main intent for the formation
of another, according to one of its members, has been to
promote positive attitudes among the Hong Kong people
towards the changes that must come, and to provide more
'balanced' views.
Action in the System
The press of. Hong Kong distinguished the political
activist groups into 'political opinion' and 'political
participation groups'. While political opinion groups refer
to groups that are mainly commentators, political
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participation groups refer to groups that have members
running for elections. In practice, however, with the
notable exception of Meeting Point, which plays a quite
central role in the organisation of the electoral campaigns
of some of its members, most of the groups do not seem to be
an important factor in the elections but just one name in a
long list of organisations that support the candidate, and,
the positions of the groups are binding on their members
that have been elected to the District Boards, or Urban and
Regional Councils. Positions in these Boards and Councils,
which have limited scope of power, moreover, serve primarily
to enchance the status of their members and provide them
with easier access to the press rather than giving them any
direct channel of influence. The political activist groups
in Hong Kong, therefore, are first and foremost opinion
groups.
While their concerns are broader, the main tactic of
the political activist groups, like the pressure croups in
the 70s, is to exert pressure on the Govermental authorities
through publicity in the mass media, and have become in
effect a new, special kind of pressure groups, groups that
do not rely on the mobilisation of the masses but the image
as learned people. Some of these groups, Moreover, are
known to have direct access the officials of the Chinese
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and Hong Kong Governments and rely therfore not entirely on
the mass media but also on behind the scene lobbying. As
these groups do not seem to have significant power bases,
the significance of lobbying as a channel of influence would
depend above all on the willingness of the authorities to
listen to 'more balanced views'. That 'democracy-promotion'
groups have to rely on this undemocratic technique of
lobbying reflects the power constellation of the present
system: whatsoever of their ideals, reforms have to be
sought after as 'gifts' granted from above. What have been
discussed, we would never know, of course.
Suggestive of the role of the political activist
groups in the system is the collective term for them in Hong
Kong: 'political opinion sector' ( 政 見 界 ) . That Means,
rather than groups that articulate and represent different
interests in society, these political activist groups from a
quite homogeneous circle of people whose main function is to
voice out views on political issues- people specialised in
talking politics. In accordance with this image, the
political activist groups in Hong Kong are always trying to
search for consensus and coordinate their forces. The first
attempt is the formation of the 'Joint Conference for the
Study of the Green Paper on Representative Government' by
the political activist groups and a wide variety of other
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bodies in late 1984. Some political groups maintained
regular contacts after the issue is over and in 1985, a
'Joint Conference of Political Opinion Groups on Basic Law'
政 見 團 體 基 本 法 聯 席 會 議 is formed, to concern
itself with the drafting of 'Basic Law', the
mini-constitution for Hong Kong after 1997. While
collaboration is helpful in enhancing their influence,-it is
not wothout difficulties. The 'Joint Conference for the
Study of Green Paper on Representative Government', for
example, had to settle on a declaration that contained only
lowest-denominator-type demands, and the groups are known to
be divided by mutual jealousies and personal conflicts.
Still, the attempt to cooperate has not been abandoned. The
Hong Kong Affairs Society, for example, is now trying hard
to persuade all other groups to accept its proposals for
political reforms. Openly at least, the political activists
in Hong Kong are always searching for consensus.
The politiacl activist groups in Hong Kong, however,
are not completley isolated. While groups of more
and make no serious attempt to establish connections with
the masses, the more gressroots-oriented groups are always
eager to build up more viable ties with the masses. WhereaE
the Meeting Point sets up branches itself, a more economic
established upper-middle class maintained an elitist image
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way'is through connections with the pressure groups formed
in the 70s, especially the community-based groups. At
present, links of the political activist groups with the
pressure groups are primarily on an individual level,
through the middle-class organisers of the pressure groups
who are often also members of the political groups, and
anyway, socially and ideologically close to them. As 'a
result of the politicisation engendered by the Hong Kong's
future issue and introduction of elections by universal
suffrage, moreover, the once apolitical pressure groups are
acting more and more like the political activist groups,
joining them in voicing out on more general issues and
supporting candidates in elections, and ther has been
certain collaboration of forces among the political and
pressure groups. They have, in fact, forged a common
identity with the name 'People's Groups' ( 民 間 團 体 ）
Another name that serve similar purposes is 'Newly Emergen
Political Forces' 1 （ 新 興 政 治 力 量 ）
To develop stronger ties with the masses and local
leaders, members of these grassroots-oriented political
groups and pressure groups would usually set up offices in
their respective districts after they have been elected to
receive individual complaints, and deal with local issues.
Recently, a new political organisation organised by several
74
smaller political activist groups are joined by some of
these 'offices' of District Board members and several other
community-based groups. To a certain extent, the new
orgainisation represents a convergence of forces resultant
from middle-class politicisation induced by the 'Hong Kong's
future' issue on one hand, and grassroots politicisation
induced by the introduction of.local elections on the other.
However, those who have joined the new political
organisation are primarily the young educated organisers of
community-based groups, not the masses themselves, and to
the extent the politicisation of the masses are still
limited in Hong Kong, we should not overestimate the
organisational strength of these groups. Even the more
grassroots-oriented political activist groups in Hong Kong
are, therfore, still a long way from developed political
organisation with secure mass basses. Unlike the student
movement in the 70s, the political activist groups are no
longer movements in search of a direction, but they remain
leaders in search of followers. And, some admit, time is
running out for them.
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CHAPTER 5
Selected Case Studies: A Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this chapter, I would present case studies of
several representative political activist groups in Hong
Kong. The purpose is to provide a more in-depth
understanding of the origin, mode of operation, and
organisational characteristics of these groups as well as
the ideological spectrum they represented. And, to show
the general trend of development, the presentation of these
case studies would be arranged in order of the date of
formation of these groups.
The Hong Kong Observers ( 香 港 觀 察 社 )
The Hong Kong observers is important as the first
middle class opinion group in Hong Kong and in many ways it
foreshadows the political groups that are to emerge in the
1980s.
It originated as a group of young people invited by
the City District Office to express their views on community
issues. These young people later formed themselves into a
group that discuss various social issues and were joined by
other interested individuals. The group was formally
registered in 1975.
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As a rule, members of the group come from well-to-do
families, have enjoyed higher education, and were in an
early stage of their career as professionals when they
joined the group. One significant influence on them seemed
to be that most of them have spent part of their formative
years overseas, a fact repeatedly mentioned in articles they
introduced themselves. And it is observed that, while they
are all ethnically Chinese, they are culturally very
Western.
From the very beginning, the group has had a'quite
'elitist' public image, but it makes no effort to enlarge
its membership base and build up contacts with the masses,
which is regarded as unnecessary for the role they choose to
play. The Hong Kong observers, in fact, is never a large
group. Reported to have 50 members in 1981, it had only 35
members by late 1985.
The group have two broad aims: to stimulate informed
discussions in social and political issues, and to urge the
Hong Kong Government to be more responsive. A more
fundamental goal, however, is to achieve in Hong Kong, a
better quality of life in a more caring environment, which,
they argue, would require a generation of a community spirit
by the Hong Kong people themselves.
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The main activity of the group is social criticism
and it is known for its newspaper articles on various social
and political issues. It has also championed individual
causes against what they consider as improper behaviour on
the part of the bureaucrats, notably in the Precious Blood
School Incident in 1978 which involved a scandal of
corruption on the part of the school authority, student
protests, and a government decision to close the school.
beginning as a quite harsh critic of the Government,
the group gradually becomes more and more 'respectable', and
it is now known to have frequent access to the government
bureaucrats. Taken as a whole, the group seems to be losing
momentum and is overshadowed by the political croups sprang
up in early 1980s, possibly because that many of its members
are now busy professionals with less time to devote to the
organ.isation they created when they were younger and more
idealistic.
A columnist, who is also a member of the croup,
concluded her comments on the Hong Kong Observers in 1982
with the following lines:
And essentially, by and large,
the Observers believe in the
present system. They would like
to see an ombudsman installed, and
elected members in the Legislative
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Council, a more even distribution
of income, but they are
reformist, not radical.(SCMP,
April 1, 1982)
This comment can be extended to almost all the
political activist groups that have emerged in the 80s,
except for those even the reformism of which is doubtful.
More importantly, the emergence of the Hong Kong
Observers signified a growing political awareness among the
middle class as well as an increasing sense of
identification with Hong Kong: a Hong Kong people
consciousness which seems to be developing in the late
1970s.
Meeting Point.
Meeting Point is, among the political activist
groups in Hong Kong, the most dynamic, organised, and
ideologically articulate, and there should be, therefore, a
more detailed analysis of the group.
Origin and Development
Meeting Point is formally founded on January 9,
1983, when the Sino-British negotiation on Hong Kong's
future was caught in a deadlock over the sovereignty issue.
On the same date it was founded, it issued a statement
( 匯 點 )
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supporting China's resumption of the sovereignty of Hong
Kong with proposals for comprehensive social, economic, and
political reforms, and became the first non-Peking sponsored
group in Hong Kong that publicly supported China's position
in the negotiation.
Organisation of the group, however, began in 1982 as
a group of intellectuals coming together to discuss the
social issues of Hong Kong. These people are made up of
former members of the She-hui faction of the student
movement in the mid-1970s as well as other younger
university graduates that shared their general ideological
orientations.
Primarily a 'peer group' organisation in its first
two years of formation, Meeting Point has gradually extended
its member base and built up a quite elaborate
organisational structure with a council, an executive
committee, and committees that study issues in different
policy areas. A recent innovation is to set up branches in
different localities, a development related to the election
of some of its members to the district boards.
Membership Characteristics
Meetina Point has in early 1986 around 300 members,
counting also a category of membership called 'Friends of
Meeting Point 匯 點 之 友
which made up about a half of
the total number. According to the estimation of one
member, however, only thirty to fourty people are active in
the various activities of the group.
An outstanding characteristic of the members of
Meeting Point is that they are predominantly young and
highly educated. According to an internal survey carried
out by the group, 70% of the group's members are from 26 to
35 in age, and 90% of the members have received post-
secondary education. More strikingly, one-quarter of the
members have obtained higher degrees, a remarkable
phenomenon in Hong Kong where a tiny proportion of the small
percentage of the young people that enter into university
would continue to do graduate work, and it suggests that
members of the group tend to be exceptionally intellectually
oriented. The same survey, in fact, discovers as the main
interests of the members 'study of the social issues of Hong
Knnc anr9 rhin
As for occupations, about half of the members arE
employed in educational institutions, social servicE
agencies, and the media, with others in commerce, finance,
legal profession, etc. A predominant majority of Meeting
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Point's members, the information suggests, are
semi-professionals, and as a corollary of their youth, it is
observed, they are usually not established in their
respective professions (Meeting Point, 1986:3).
Ideology
Officially, the general orientations of Meeting
Point is defined in terms of three loose principles they
named 'New Three People's Principles': nationalism,
democracy, and (concern for) people's livelihood.
Nationalism, refers, of course,to Chinese
nationalism, and it is continually emphasised by the group.
Members of Meeting Point, however, do not seem to be ardent
nationalists that have an unconditional, and unreflexive
emotional identification with China. Nationalism to them is
rather something that can be and should be argued for, and
they take pains to state that 'identification with the
nation is not equivalent to identification with the regime'.
This emphasis on nationalism serves obviously the strategic
purpose of setting the group apart from people that wish to
use democracy to keep out Peking's influence in the eyes of
the Chinese leaders, but what pleases Peking does not seem
to please the public of Hong Kong- there are people who
consitently think that Meeting Point is too pro-China to be
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acceptable.
Democracy is Meeting Point's main object of
campaign. Officially, democracy is argued for in terms of
human rights and more importantly, as functionally necessary
for a highly autonomous, stable, and legitimate government.
More privately, however, members of the group express a
desire to introduce 'countervailing power' into a system
dominanted by bureaucrats. While Meeting Point is quite
consistent in demanding for democratic reforms, a certain
moderation of tone over its years of development can be
discerned. In 1983, 'widespread participation of the
people', it was argued, 'is a necessary condition for the
creation of a good Hong Kong in the future' (Meeting Point,
1984:2-3) however, the main goal of democratic reforms in
Hong Kong is to 'fulfill the aim of Hong Kong as a highly
autonomous Special Administrative Zone', i.e. democracy is
necessary to complete the design initiated at the top
(Meeting Point, recruitment pamphlet, 1986).
'Deradicalisation' is also discernible in the sphere
of 'people's livelihood', i.e. social and economic reforms.
In the 'Proposals for Hong Kong's Future' issued in 1983, we
see more radical proposals like popular supervision of
public utilities, encouragement of the growth of trade
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unions, even labour participation in management. In 1984,
one principle underlying Meeting Point's stand in social
policy is 'more equitable distribution of resources to
shorten the distance between social strata' (Meeting Point,
1984:58). In 1986, however, the goal of social policy is to
'take care of the interests of various social strata, and to
provide equal opportunity of development for all citizens'
(Meeting Point, 1986:17), and in the recruitment pamphlet,
we find under the heading 'Stand in People's Livelihood' not
even the standard phrase 'more reasonable distribution of
resources', but an additional qualifying principle
stipulating that 'policies concerning people's livelihood
should consider also technical feasibility, political
accountability, and financial solvency'.
In a general way, traces of the influence of the
thinking of the She-hui faction can be seen in the
orientations of Meeting Point, for example, in its emphasis
on popular participation and in its argument that the future
of Hong Kong is inseparable from that of China. The mild
reformism of Meeting Point, however, is far removed from the
radicalism of the student activists in mid-1970s. As an
official of the group put it, to maintain a more favourable
image in the public, Meeting Point must appear 'balanced and
squarely in the centre' ( 四 平 八 稳 ) a stance unthinkable for
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the radical student activists but indispensable now for
Meeting Point for its saleability in the 'political market'.
This 'deradicalisation', however, is more than a
strategic withdrawal in face of unfavourable political
circumstances. It is rather a necessary corollary of
Meeting Point's enlargement of membership base and attempt
to find a legitimate place in the existing institutions.
Ten years' encounter with the hard social reality, moreover,
do seem to have its impact. 'While we should not abandon
the radical vision of a good society, we have to maintain a
distance between our theory and our practice', a founding
member of Meeting Point and formerly a leading figure of the
she-hui faction told the author.
Activities
Initially organised as a forum to exchange ideas,
Meeting Point has turned into an opinion group, and then
also an electoral group, following the development of
political circumstances.
The politically relevant activities of the group can
be divided into three main categories: first, continual
concern for the design of future political institutions of
Hong Kong, both that initiated by Hong Kong government and
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that by Peking second, supporting candidates in District
Board and Urban Council elections and third, study of and
comments on various public policies, with an aim to develop
'alternative policies'. A new attempt is to involve in
community issues and build up ties with local residents,
through setting up brances.
Problems and Prospects
The most pressing problem of Meeting Point is
finance, as the group relies primarily on members'
subscription and can obtain no substantial donation, and
this may explain partly Meeting Point's drive to expand its
membership base, which in turn contributes to its
moderation. An innovation to solve the problem is to
develop affiliated businesses for the group, notably a
consultant firm that provides economic information about
China.
Another problem relates to the members' involvement
in the group's activities. The obvious obstacle is, of
course, these people all have their own regular jobs and can
participate in the functions of the organisation at their
leisure time. Moreover, it is observed that participation
rapidly falls off in between the elections, which themselves
are losing appeal as the freshness has gone. One of the
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group's aim to establish branches is, in fact, to provide
more meaningful involvement for the members.
A further problem is that people still identify the
group with its prominent members, and the opinions expressed
by these individuals therefore would be confused with the
official stand of the group, frustrating its
'image-building' efforts and sometimes causing diplomatic.
difficulties. Meeting Point, however, is ostensibly trying
to revert this tendency. Using as far as possible different
spokespersons in different occasion, it tries to build up an
independent image of the group and differentiate it from the
persons of 'political stars' in it.
All the above mentioned problems indicate the
premature state of Meeting Point, the 'most developed
political activist group in Hong Kong', as a political
organisation. The attempted solutions, however, are part of
the parcel of its attempt to build up a more viable
organisation. Meeting Point is in the direction of becoming
a party, its chairman declared in an open forum in March
1986. But in practice, the approach is very cautious.
According to the group's schedule, a platform which
translates the abstract principles into concrete proposals
would be completed in three years' time- obviously a
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political, more than administrative decision--- as what
would be acceptable by the authorities would be clear three
years later. Using perhaps not a not very appropriate term,
a member of the Meeting Point characterises the approach of
the group as 'incremental', i.e. it would watch after each
step is taken. 'We would not set our goals too high', the
Vice-Chairman of the group told the students in a visit to
the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 'Just achieve the
limited that is possible if we have only limited resources'.
Therefore, rather than an organisation to share power in the
future governing of Hong Kong, more realistically, it is
described as one of the media that promotes the
politicisation of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong Affairs Society ( 太 平 山 学 會 )
Hong Kong Affairs Society is another more dynamic
-and organisationally developed political activist group in
Hong Kong. In support of democratic reforms, the general
orientation of this group is quite different from that of
the more reformist groups like Meeting Point, and represents
another ideological current among the politically aware
middle class of Hong Kong.
Origin
Hong Kong Affairs Society was founded in February
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1984, in response to the crisis generated by the rapid
devaluation of the Hong Kong dollars in September 1983, and
gained prominence in the public through the two forums on
Hong Kong's future it organised in 1984.
Founders of the group, like that of many others, are
people that knew one another when they were students and
maintained contacts after graduation. They have been active
in Literary Clubs in the 60s and later in the student
organisations of Hong Kong University. Some of them had
taken part in the 'Protect Tiao-Yu-Toi Islands Campaign'.
In short, they belong to the first generation of student
activists in Hcnc Kong which appeared in late 60s and early
70s. And participation in these activities, Huang Chen-ya,
the group's present president, admitted, did have an impact
on their social and political consciousness, although he
thought what was more important was the growing up of a new
generation in Hong Kong the movements reflected.
Membership Characteristics
Beginning with a membership of about 30 in 1984, the
group has now around 100 members, which are again
predominantly young and highly educated. At least as far as
the core members are concerned, however, though still
predominantly below 40, members of the group are slightly
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older than most of the other organisations, and are more
established in their respective professions.
Ideology
Consistent with the official image of the group as a
forum for the exchange of divergent ideas, Hong Kong Affairs
Society, unlike Meeting Point, does not have officially
defined guiding principles. We can, however, discern the
dominant line of thought of the group through a study of its
various articles and statements on social and political
issues, as well as from the views aired publicly by its
leading members.
In simplified terms, the underlying ideology of the
group is a belief in capitalism, open society, and
pluralistic political system--- indeed, all the standard
liberal values. Consistently, the group has emphasised
procedural justice, and 'fair play', which means equal
opportunity for all concerned parties, is their catchword.
Their diagnosis of the political situation is that
the transition of power in the return of Hong Kong's
sovereignty to China necessitates the introduction of a more
representative political system with directly elected
political leaders if Hong Kong is to maintain a high degree
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of autonomy and viability. Such a system, it is reasoned,
would be legitimate, flexible and best able to foster the
development of high-quality local political leaders. And
direct elections, in the group's opinion, would not pose any
threat to the economic status quo. Poor people are also
rational people, the group argues, and to shut off their
opportunity for participation would just force them to use
uninstitutionalised means of influence. That there should
be institutionalised conflict and compromises among
different values and interests is, in fact, the fundamental
belief of the group, a belief manifested in the original
purpose of providing a forum for the exchange of conflicting
views and in their recent proposal for a proportional
representation system in Hong Kong. What is most important
to them is that there should be 'rules of the game' accepted
by all.
The above represents the public stand of the Hong
Kong Affairs Society and its focus is on the situation of
Hong Kong. On a more private level, however, core members
of the group are motivated by ideals that have a wider frame
of reference. Having been active in the literary clubs,
they are known to be heavily influenced by the Chinese
scholars that came to Hong Kong after 1949 and have
developed a strong cultural identification with China--- to
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them, an open, pluralistic political system is not only the
solution to Hong Kong's problem, but also the way out of
China's predicament. 'We must do something', Huang Chen-ya
told the author in the interview. 'The mistakes of Chinese
history should not be allowed to repeat themselves'. And
what is of primary importance, he pointed out, is to promote
an open, tolerant, and participant political culture. His
concern, obviously, is not just Hong Kong, but the Chinese
nation.
Development and Prospects
As it is now, Hong Kong Affairs Society is much more
than just a forum. It is an opinion group that has
developed its own specific stands: a commentator on
political issues and a critic of the 'inappropriate
behaviour' of the governmental authorities. In 1986, one of
its core members has been elected to the Urban Council, and
the group has recruited in members who are eager to
participate in elections. Hong Kong Affairs Society,
therefore, seems now to be on the brink of becoming more
active in participating in the political institutes. But
there are objections among some of its members, and taken
as a whole, the group is hesitant. One manifestation of
this hesitation is the confusion over the group's role in
the performance of duties of its members that have been
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elected Urban Councillors and District Board members.
Hong Kong People's Association
Hong Kong People's Association originated in 1984
when it was known that Britain had given up its demand for
continuation of its administration in Hong Kong after 1997
and was formally founded in December 1984 with 31 members,
which were part of the individuals that had signed an
advertisement pledging Hong Kong people to 'take up the
challenge' posed by the oncoming changes.
What made the group stand out is the composition of
its members. As professionals, senior executives, and
university lecturers, they belong to Hong Kong's first
veneration of professional, managerial, and intellectual
elite that has emerged in the 1970s. Primarily graduated
from the same university, and not more than 5 years
3ifferent in age, unlike the founding members of Meeting
Point and Hong Kong Affairs Society, however, members of the
long Kong People's Association have not been influenced by
any 'deviant' ideologies, neither Neo-leftism nor
Jeo-Confucianism. And it is not without reason that they
were seen at the time by others as the most hopeful
:andidates to inherit power from the colonial bureaucrats.
They are, in fact, among the emerging leaders of Hong Kong,
( 港 人 协 会 )
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the same type of people that are playing an increasingly
important role in various sectors of Hong Kong, including
the bureaucracy--- some of its members had actually been
Administrative Officers' of the bureaucracy before they
turned to the private sector.
The group, however, do not seem to have developed
any coherent set of views among its members on social and
political issues in Hong Kong besides the general aim of
fostering a stable transition of sovereignty, and the role
the group has intended to play in the system remains
ambiguous. It looked ambitious in the early stage of its
formation with the declared aims to build up an
'above-class' organisation composed of people from different
strata and prepare for the direct elections to Legislative
Council that is believed to come after 1987, and it did show
some drive in supporting candidates in the District Board
Elections in March 1985. The group, however, seemed to have
lost momentum rapidly. There was information that the group
was going to be dissolved in December 1985, and in April
1986, the group was reported to be having agreed on playing
the limited role of a mere social commentator.
As outsiders, it is difficult to know why the
group's members decided on a 'withdrawal from an obviously
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more ambitious initial position. What we can learn from the
retreat is, perhaps, that emergence of independent political
leaders would not be an easy matter in Hong Kong: there does
not seem to be many candidates with potentials that possess
the will to try, or the objective conditions are so
unfavourable that these people do not see any reasonable
opportunity for success
( 香 港 勵 進 會 )Progressive Hong Kong Society
In different degrees, all the above discussed groups
have embodied 'deviant' orientations in Hong Kong, whose
founders are at least exceptionally conscientious people.
This is not so for the Progressive Hong Kong Society which
as a group is as pragmatic as any Hong Kong people. And
what it reflects are the 'political opportunities' available
in Hong Kong.
The image of the group is closely tied to the person
of Miss Maria Tam, its chairman, a political entrepreneur
that worked her way up as an elected Urban Councillor and
has later been appointed a member of the Legislative Council
and Executive Council, whose fame was at a new height in
March, 1985, after playing successfully the role of patron
for several candidates running for the district board
elections. And it was the time the formation of the group
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was publicly announced.
Founding members of the group include members of
some established business families, urban councillors,
district board members, a Legislative Councillor, and
several publicly prominent professionals, as well as a few
trade union leaders. It is, however, the participation of
the rich families that have attracted the most attention and
the group is known to be supported by these families through
a trust fund.
What make Progressive Hong Kong Society a class of
its own, however, is not only the status of its members and
the support from the rich, but also that it declines to
express any specific stand on any social and political
issues. It seems to have only one principle--- to build up
a cross-class organisation in which people from different
social stratum can exchange their views so that policies
acceptable to all can be formulated. After more than one
year of formation, however, such an exchange does not appear
to be particularly fruitful, and except for once in its
first annual general meeting, in which some very general,
lcwest-denominator type pricniple were announced on economic
policies, no concluded views have been made public.
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Interest aggregation is the work of political
parties, and the formulation of all-acceptable comprehensive
policies makes little sense if the group is not going to be
a ruling institution. Office-bearers of the grcup, however,
have repeatedly emphasised that the froup is not a political
party. Since it was founded the group has consistently
maintained a low political profile, and what the members of
the group are going about are little known in public.
Outwardly, the basic strategy of the group is
'fence-sitting'--- wait and see which course of action is
the most rewarding and which stand is the safest to take.
But it does not seem to be just sitting there inertly.
One-tenth of the members of the Basic Law :onsultative
Committee, it has been noted, are members of the Progressive
Hong Kong Society.
'What the Progressive Hong Kong Society engaged in',
an observer remarked, is secondary political
organisation. That is, rather than organisinc the masses,
it tries to recruit individuals that already possess certain
political capital and can either appeal to or are connected
with the masses. And the group seems to be relatively
successful in obtaining the sympathy, if not support, of the
Chinese authority.
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'The group plays the role of an agent for the big
Chinese capitalists who are not at the center of power of
the colony without committing too much of their resources',
another observer remarked to the author. If direct
elections are really important in selecting the future
government, the group can serve as the electoral
organisation for the capitalists. Or, at least, it can
serve as a coordinating committee for individuals interested
in 'politics' as a 'honour-distribution' system.
Suggestive of the role of Tam, its chief organiser,
intends the group to play is her proposal that the business
families of Hong Kong should form into an organisation to
support a political party financially, and therefore, to
rule indirectly, following the example of the influential
Japan Federation of Economic Organisation.
Such an idea, however, is reported to be objected by
some members of the executive committee of t'.-Ie group as it
would obviously violate the official 'cross-class'
orientation of the group (see Jan 7, 1986 SCMP). And it
remains to be seen, how class lines can really be crossed by
the Progressive Hong Kong Society.
As a 'party of notables', it can be expected, the
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Progressive Hong Kong Society is not noted for internal
cohesiveness. Tensions developed among its members, it is
reported, over who should run as candidates in the indirect
elections to the Legislative Council in 1985, and its
members turned out competing against each other for the same
seat. The group matters, it seems, so far as it serves the
individual ambitions of its members.
The prominence of the Progressive Hong Kong Society
enjoyed despite its lack of any ideology, a cohesive
organisation, and viable connections with the masses reveals
that the more important political capital in Hong Kong are
still individual personal image and support of people at the
top, the rich and the governmental authorities.
The close tie of the group with the personal imagE
of Miss Maria Tam, however, does show itself to be an
election to the Urban Council in 1986, people were quick to
ask: what would be the fate of the Progressive Hong Kong
Society? The ups and downs of Maria Tam, it seems, is also
the ups and downs of the Progressive Hong Kong Society,
which may be no more than a kind of 'patron-client network'
with Tam at its centre(l).
weakness, When the candidate supported by Tam failed in the
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Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood
( 香 港 民 主 民 生 協 進 會 )
While Hong Kong Affairs Society and Hong Kong
People's Association are creation of the university
graduates of the late 60s and and early 70s, and Meeting
Point early and mid 70s, Hong Kong Association for Democracy
and People's Livelihood is primarily the work of still
younger people, who graduated from the post-secondary
institutions of Hong Kong in the late 70s and early 80s.
The organisation originated as an attempt by three
small political opinion groups, Hong Kong Policy Viewer, New
Hong Kong Society and Soceity for Social Research, and a
district-based organisation, Shamshuipo People's Livelihood
Concern Group, to collaborate their forces and was later
joined by other grc'ps like Association for Democracy and
Public Justice and Septentrio Academy, and various offices
of district board members. The purpose is to overcome the
limits of the existing organisation as instrument of
political participation by building up a larger, more
effective organisation. The formation of the group was
publicly announced in April, 1986, and the process of formal
registration has not yet been completed.
The new organisation, however, is not strictly
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speaking, a coalition of the groups, nor does it lead to the
dissolution of the existing groups. The structure of the
old groups are preserved, and their members participated
individually in the new organisation on a voluntary basis.
The point is to maintain at the present moment maximum
flexibility while creating a group with more united purpose.
The new organisation is noted for its connections
with locally based people's livelihood concern groups and
offices of district board members, side products of the
establishment of district boards. However, the link of the
organisation with these groups is on an individual rather
than an organisational level, and it is predominantly the
young college-craduate organisers of these groups
dissatisfied with merely dealing with mundane local issues
that have joined the new organisation. The same apply for
the 'pressure- croups' whose leaders as a whole are not
active in the new organisation. A gap, it seems, still
exists between the broader orientations of the younc
intellectuals and the day-to-day concern of the grassroots.
The organisation is distinguished from the above
analysed groups also for the fact that it has a clear
platform with quite concrete proposals. In general, the
group's stand is for a popularly elected government, more
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active role of the government in economy, more protection to
the weak and unfortunate, and more rights to the labour.
The tone, however, is mild and the organisation takes care
to place the objective 'to preserve the stability and
prosperity of Hong Kong and promote economic development',
before the clause 'to promote a more reasonable distribution
of resource and improve the qualities of life of the middle
and lower strata' in its constitution.
The organisation also has a quite detailed
constitution reflecting perhaps the experience its founders
gained in student organisations. Most 'party-like' in
design, however, its spokesman still said that it is not a
political party, but a political association aiming to
participate in politics and to study public policies.
The groups has now recruited about 100 members.
Most of them, like the members of other groups, are young
college graduates, and at this very early stage, its
development is yet to be seen.
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Note
(1) Lemarchard(1981) defines 'patron-client' ties as bonds
between individuals of unequal power and socioeconomic
status, voluntarily entered into and derive their legitimacy
from expectations of mutual benefits.
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CHAPTER 6
Reflections on the-Conditions for Political Action in
Hong Kong
I have argued in chapter 2 that while Hong Kong
society has been largely 'depoliticised' as a result of the
colonial bureaucracy's skillfull co-optation of the
socio-economic elites and the political alienation of an
immigrant Chinese population which inclines to solve its
problems within its own social organisation, the rise of a
new generation, emergence of an educated middle class, and
progressive politisation of social issues should generate
pressures for politics outside the bureaucracy in Hong Kong.
In chapter 3, I show that the political awakening of the
young people in Hong Kong can be traced -back to the mid
1960s and pressure group politics has been developing since
the 1970s. The picture of political activist groups I
present through chapter 4 to chapter 5, however, reveals
that only a small minority of the educated middle class in
Hong Kong has participated in these political groups even at
a time when fundamental political changes are bound to be
introduced into Hong Kong in the process of decolonisation,
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and the commitment of those who have participated do not
seem to be particularly strong. The majority of the members
of the political groups, in fact, can be regarded as people
belong to subcultural communities, if we use the term
subculture in a loose sense.
The socio-economic conditions LaPalombara and
Weiner(1966:19-21) suggest as prerequisites for the
development of political parties are largely present in Hong
Kong, and an incipient participation crisis seem to be
developing in Hong Kong with the 'pressure groups' stepping
up their demands in early 1980s, even without the emergence
of the issue of Hong Kong's future. The organisation of
political groups in Hong Kong, however, remains at a very
primitive stage. It is invariably the middle classes, it has
been noted, that have provided political leadership in the
peripheral couries (Johnson, 1985). The prime majority of
the educated middle class in Hong Kong, yet, do not want to
have any part in politics. At this time of 'state crisis',
people with vested interests in the present system, should
have come up and defend it and those with misgivings
towards the system, should try to promote their desired
changes. Interests in politics, however, remain low in Hong
Kong and what we face here is not simply mass passivity but
political passivity of elites and would-be elites.
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One possible explanation for the phenomenon is what
has happened is a truncated development. The political
groups are still at a very early stage of development, when
China showed its reservations towards rapid democratic
reforms and development of political parties. Therefore,
people are discouraged from joining the political groups and
the development of the organisation of the existing groups
is hindered, if not arrested.
While an 'inheritance party' to take over from the
colonial bureaucrats seems to be unacceptable to the Chinese
leaders, there are, however, still room to influence the
future development of Hong Kong, and Chinese leaders have
recognised the status of the political groups in Hong Kong
by providing them with positions in the Basic Law
Consultative Committee. And in the forseeable future it is
unlikely that joining the political groups would involve any
personal danger. Moreover, it is also doubtful whether the
existing groups could have shown more dynamism, given the
limited commitment of the members.
Another possible explanation is that the socioeconomic
elites of of Hong Kong, who have always relied on the
colonial government to take care of their interests, see any
political innovations as as potential threats to their
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entrenched positions in the colony. Therefore, rather than
supporting the political groups, they try to court Peking
and persuade the Chinese leaders to maintain as far as
possible the present system. Their interests, it can be
argued, will be well served in a 'colonial system' with a
changed master, and their attitude towards the political
groups is one of scarcely concealed suspicion, if not
ant-annn i m
This may explain why political organisation of the
elites has been so lukewarm in Hong Kong. Yet those that
have not enjoyed access to the Chinese leaders should not
remain so inactive, and a political organisation with an
adequate membership base would not require the patronage of
the economic elites.
'nyway, if the limits are simply something out there,
then we should discern among the people of Hong Kong a deep
sense of frustration, and even heart-felt anger. The
majority of the people in Hong Kong, however, seem to be
disillusioned from the very beginning and the feeling is, as
far as I can sense it, not very deep. The sense of political
powerlessness, even among the educated and young, it seems,
is greater than the political reality would require, and
they give up before making the very first attempt.
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It is now tempting to invoke Chinese political culture
as an explanation. Is it that the Hong Kong Chinese like
those the Chinese scholar Liang Chi-Chao met in the
Chinatowns of America, being 'clannish rather than
public-spirited, slaves to tradition rather than
progressive, dedicated to the purpsuit of selfish gain and
indifferent to the larger welfare of the community', are
incapable of making use of the considerable opportunity for
political organisaton and self-expression? (Grieder,
1981:167) Or can we argue, along with Pye(1968) and
Soloman(1971), that the Chinese are irreparably
authoritarian and have a hysterical fear for airing
differences in opinion? And does Hong Kong's political
groups' hesitation over taking more active part in politics
reflects traditional Chinese scholars' anxiety over
involving in struggle for power as a result of the general
distrust of government of any kind among the Chinese? (Gray,
The problem how far traditional Chinese patterns of
behaviour have been modified in Hong Kong awaits further
inv.estigations. Open criticisms of government, however, can
now be seen almost every day in Hong Kong television, and
the people of Hong Kong would go readily to petition the
Governor if the bureaucracy fails them. The 'parochial'
1979:204)
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overseas Chinese, moreover, we should remember, had been the
main source of financial support of the republican movement
in China in the turn of the century, when the cause did not
look very hopeful.The urban middle class of Taiwan, another
Chinese community, has organised a more viable
'Dang-Wail
（ 黨 外 ) 'Outside-the-Party') movement as an
opposition to the ruling Nationalist Party, in face of a
much more hostile authority. And, at an earlier stage of
economic development, political mobilisation has been
widespread in Singapore on the eve of independence.
Still another line of argument is that in face of
fundamental, and possibly disruptive changes of the
political system, the middle class of Hong Kong opt for an
'exit' rather than 'voice' choice. Instead of taking up the
challenges in Hong Kong, they choose to. emigrate overseas.
Why so many people would opt for an 'exit' choice, however,
is itself a significant problem, and those who can emigrate,
after all, is a minority.
The editorial of a newspaper widely read by the
educated middle class of Hong Kong has an answer to our
problems:
We are not ignorant that it is
cowardly to mind just economic
striving but not political
participation, but we think that
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this is the only way the people of
Hong Kong can survive. In
politics, Hong Kong people have
always been cowardly. We have had
no courage to fight the colonial
government, and no courage to
struggle with the Japanese. Why
should we now have the courage to
receive the 'burning stick' the
British pass to us (H.K.Economic
J'l, Dec. 16, 1985)
However, it does not require much heroism to join the
political groups, which up to now are not fighting anybody.
What has incapacitated the people of Hong Kong is a less
than rational sense of powerlessness, a kind of direct
reaction rather than outcome of rational evaluation, and
what is lacking seems to be will and commitment.
The questions why there has been such an ingrained
sense of powerlessness and why the commitment is so weak can
be answered only with a wild stretch of immagination.
Keniston's discussions on young educated Americans' social
alienation and lack of reformist zeal may provide us with
some inspirations. As a melting pot, Keniston (1971:27-80)
notes, the American society lacks from the beginning clear
traditions and definitions of good life. The specialisation
and abstractness of work, even among the professionals, lead
to the dissociation of imagination from problems in everday
life and human imagination becomes tied to 'packaged
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fantansies' provided by the mass media which are often the
opposites of what they experience in life. Social cohesion,
thus gained, he argues, is not cohesion of shared goals but
of shared escapes and dreads. Material progress, moreover,
leave the people with no significant cause to strive for.
Rapid, unguided social changes lead to rapid obsolence of
ethics and development of types of social character whose
commitment is to adapt to the shifting pressures of the
environment, as well as a strong present orientation and
privatism to provide a stronger sense of mastery over the
environment. And men feel powerless before a social order in
whose day-to-day workings they are technically enmeshed but
whose direction they feel unable to judge. Above all, there
is a 'long-term decline of positive morality, which has not
only left men unable to visualize a better future, but has
deprived them articulate bases to judge the present'
(Keniston, 1971: 45). What Keniston have observed, in fact,
are not only the specific conditions of American society but
also the general conditions of modern industrial societies.
The study of Japanese political orientations by
Flanagan (1978:129-161) is also illuminating. The Japanese,
he finds, while rank high in political knowledge, exhibit a
very low level of political involvement and activism, a set
of orientations he terms 'spectator culture' and he explains
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the phenonmenon in terms of the uncontested incorporation of
different social classes into the political system of Japan
which preceded the development of strong demands for
participation. And, we should note, there have been similar
findings on the political culture of Hong Kong (King,
1977:147-168)
A further hint is provided by Pye(1971:121), who
argues, admist rapid social changes, people of the new
states most usually focus on the present and avoid as much
as possible all questions about the meaning of the past or
the prospect for the future, as a result of ambivalence
towards the past and anxiety over an uncertain future.
We are now in a better position to explain why Hong
Kong people's involvement in political activism is so low.
Perhaps more than any society in the world, the social
cohesion of Hong Kong is based on common escapes and dreads,
not common purposes. The first generation of immigrant
population 'live here as 'refugees' and 'sojourners'. The
impersonal and competitive society, however, does not foster
among the second generation a strong sense of identification
with the society. Social alienation of the immigrants are
perpetuated by the conditions of an industrial-capitalist
society. The 'parochialness' of Chinese peasants is simply
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replaced by the 'privatism' of the alienated workers and
middle class. And in a market economy of relentless
competition, what predominates has to be amoral egoism. Hong
Kong, it is often noted, is a market place where everyone
comes here to get what he or she wants and it is liked to
the extent that it can deliver the desired goods.
Commitment to the society, therefore, remains instrumental
and 'exit' is preferable than 'voice' as it would provide
more certain outcome for the individual(l).
And more than the Americans, Hong Kong people do not
have any positive values to judge their society and base a
vision of better future. Capitalism is accepted
pragmatically. Socialism is not an ideal, but a reality
across the border where living standards are much lower and
political upheavals often heard. The dominant social values
come from the parochial 'small tradition' of Chinese
peasants and are on the wane in a complex urban-industrial
society, and Western liberal and egalitarian ideals are
scarcely understood even among the highly educated.
Therefore values like 'participation' and 'public justice'
•espoushed by some of the reformist groups evoke no
enthusiastic response, and demands for social and economic
reforms are simply interpreted as selfish desires on the
part of the lower income groups to enlarge their share of
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the pie. And those profess reformist ideals are invariably
viewed with suspicion and cynicism. After all, general
improvements in living standards have left no burning issues
to rally the support of the more idealistic.
Not havinc any modest collective ideals, Hong Kong
people are also not accustomed to organise themselves -to
further their sectional interests, at least not at a large
scale. Like the Japanese, Hong Kong people have little
experience of competitive mobilisation. The colonial
authority had timely incorporated in newly emergent
socio-economic elites before they developed any strong
demand for participation, and their interests are in any
case well served in the present system. And the middle and
lower classes are preoccupied with improving their
conditions thro-_-gh individual, or more usually, familial
efforts, which seem promising in a rapidly expanding
economy. They lack therefore both experiences of political
organisation and a clear definition of communities of
interests prerec-_:isite to effective political action.
One reason Hong Kong people do not have any vision of
a better future is that they do not think such visior
realisable. For the people of Hong Kong, future is always
beyond their control. Politically, as a capitalist colon
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endorsed by a socialist superpower, a large part of Hong
Kong people's destiny seems from the very beginning
uncertain. Economically, Hong Kong people are aware that
Hong Kong is but a small manufacturing station in a global
economic system and their fortune is tied to events in far
away part of the world in which they could have little
control. And more directly, they have to feel confused and
powerless before a rapidly changing complex industrial
society with minute specialisation. Their sense of
powerlessness in front of the changes of the larger society
is therefore rooted in their everyday experiences. And the
people of Hong Kong have learned to be adaptable and
flexible, to fit oneself to the world, rather than to shape
the world as one desires, not to say that a great power of
abstraction is needed to visualise a better society than one
lives in. The great majority, therefore, consent to leave
the 'public businesses' to the bureaucrats, even though from
time to time, they may be quite dissatisfied with what the
bureaucrats have designed or done for them.
Sense of powerlessness is conducive to 'privatism' and
'present orientation', and perhaps again more than any
society of the world, the people of Hong Kong are troubled
by an ambivalence towards their past and anxiety over their
future. The reason why they are so anxious over their future
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should now be plain and as culturally proud Chinese they are
also troubled by having subjected willingly to the colonial
authority and the erosion of Chinese values they see in Hong
Kong. The editorial quoted above has, for example,
manifested quite clearly the troubled conscience of the
people of Hong Kong. The majority of the people of Hong Kong
therefore have steadily refused to look too far ahead'or
beyond. The less privileged are, of course, always
preoccupied with their day-to-day struggle for survival. But
even those more disposed to plan for their future have also
seemed stop thinking about what Hong Kong would become in
the course of returning its sovereignty to China, although
they have little trust on the guarantees of the authorities.
In face of inevitable changes, the middle classes of Hong
Kong just desperately try to maintain a hold on what they
already have and become more conservative than ever.
Thus, it should be clear now why so few people have
participated in the political groups, and why the commitment
of those have participated remains so low. Those who have
been active are either exceptionally idealistic or
interested in a political career. Hong Kong is not a
society favourable to the development of ideals and the
future of a political career is still too uncertain to be
very attractive. Political activists in Hong Kong, if they
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worth the name, therefore, necessarily form a small circle.
We should also understand why space for political
action in Hong Kong is so 'compressing'. As a small
dependent open economy, all socioeconomic reforms introduced
in Hong Kong have to be limited in scope in face of the
deinvestment threat of the capitalists. And all political
changes, it has been noted, must be within the framework of
Hong Kong as a 'special administrative zone' of China, and
the dominant attitude of the socio-economic elites toward
the political groups'is less than favourable. But, more
importantly, the political groups are not supported by any
significant section of the Hong Kong public. No ideals can
appeal to them, and they lack the will and experience to
band up to protect their self-interests. Important changes
are bound to be introduced, but the spectators are not
psychologically prepared to take up the role of actors. In
Hong Kong, impetus to change has to come from above because
there has been so little from below.
The political groups of Hong Kong, therefore, must
always appear moderate and balanced, and must cluster in the
middle of the road. For they rely on nothing other than the
image as people that have more 'balanced views'. Supported
by nobody, moreover, they cannot afford to antagonise
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anybody: they have to take care of not only the likes and
dislikes of the two government authorities, but also the
sensitivities of a wide array of 'spectators'. To cope with
the situation, the criteria of succeess some of the
activists adopt are now not that of the politicians but that
of the community workers and educators. Therefore, their
goal is not to get power, but to promote political
consciousness.
Note
(1) A study of secondary school students in Hong Kong found
that they identified with no social group beyond the nuclear
family. The students' problem reflected that of their





The political activist groups in Hong Kong, the
present study shows that, are primarily organisations of
young educated middle class. While the political awakeninc
of the second generation of Hong Kong can be traced back tc
mid 1960s, and some of the groups originate before the
emergence of the 'Hong Kong's future' issue, the
profileration of political groups in Hong Kong is
conditioned by the Sino-British negotiation on Hong Kong's
future.. And their development is stimulated by the
introduction of local universal suffrage elections in Honc
Kong, which can be interpreted as partly a response to an
of community issues, and partly a first step in
decolonisation. The political groups now function primarily
as commentators on government action and policies, and some
of them have supported candidates in local elections. In
terms of orientations, three broad types of groups can be
identified: (a) those to promote reforms when political
changes have to be introduced, (b) those to preserve the
desired general properties of the existing system, and (c)
incipient participation crisis generated by the politisation
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those organised by the elites to protect or enhance their
power. Even the reformist groups, however, are very moderate
in tone, and ideological differences among them are not
easily discernible.
That the groups are mainly formed of educated middle
class reflects the class' strategic position for political
practice as a result of the authority they enjoyed as 'men
of knowledge' and their relative freedom to align with any
other social classes, a situation similar both to other
developed and developing countries (see Gouldner,
1979:85-88 Johnson, 1985). The primary motivating force
for participation, however, is traditional Chinese
intellectuals' sense of social and political mission, while
it demonstrates at the same time Western intellectuals'
distance from the dominant values of their societies(l). And
collectively they form a new 'politicalgeneration' or, more
strictly speaking, 'political generation unit' in Hong Kong
(2).
It is only, however, a small minority of the young
educated middle class that have joined these political
groups, still less take an active part, and the thin social
support the political groups have become their chief source
of weakness. Space for political action is compressing for
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them not only because they must secure the co-operation of
both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments in the
fulfillment of their goals but also because they can nowhere
draw enthusiastic support among a public passive and not
sure what to want.
The low involvement of the people of Hong Kong, in
political activism, it is tentatively argued, is rooted in
the historical-structural context of Hong Kong as a
relatively developed but dependent capitalist colony on the
soils cf socialist China, which has precluded the
development of shared ideals and fostered a strong sense of
powerlessness, privatism, and present orientation. Moreover,
the successful cooptation of socio-economic elites by the
colonial bureaucracy and the availability of opportunities
for upward mobility have also resulted in paucity of
political experiences and diffuse class consciousness not
conducive to political organisation.
Some groups are now trying to build up stronger ties
with the masses through neighbourhood organisations. Whether
neighbourhoods can serve as an effective social base for
political mobilisation, however, is doubtful(3). Given the
present 'powerlessness' of the political groups, their
future development would depend, above all, on the design of
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the institutional framework by the two authorities. If
direct elections are introduced to the Legislative Council,
some groups may join together and others expand to form more
effective electoral organisations(4). If the present
conditions persist, with less enthusiasm perhaps, they would
continue to play the role of opinion and electoral groups.
If space for action contracts to the extent that nothing
meaningful can be achieved in a moderate manner, then we can
expect the majority of the activists to withdraw from the
political scene, leaving a minority either co-opted or
radicalised.In short, the further development of these
groups would depend on how 'democratic' Hong Kong would be
in the future, on which, thinly supported, they can have
little influence.
Political apathy and cynicism, a local sociologist
sympathetic to democratic reform has noted, is prevalent
even in the 'Western domocratic societies' (Leung, 1984:
85-87). However, as Maravall(1982: 86) argues in his study
of Spain where democracy is also introduced from above,
while lack of interest and cynicism about politics or
feelings of personal lack of influence on political events
may be compatible with firmly rooted democratic
institutions, they may be a serious weakness for a democracy
whose institutions are of recent origin and are fragile. In
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Hong Kong, they become a weakness of those who want to put
democracy into practice.
In a general sense, we can concur with
Scalapino(1953:396-7) that 'timing' is very important for
healthy development of democratic institutions and parties.
Economic development preceding the establishment of
representative government, it seems, would hinder in many
ways the development of demands for and/or acceptance of
democratic institutions (5). Alternatively, we can argue
that the weakness of the groups is rooted in a 'premature
development': while the transition of sovereignty has
stimulated the growth of the political groups in Hong Kong,
no significant sector of the society has yet learned the
need for a 'collective solution' of their problems through
participation in the central political institutions.
Whether the people of Hong Kong can ever learn the need for
'collective solution', however, is a question that cannot be
answered in advance. They may, when economic conditions
deteriorate. Then, the situation would be very fluid and
hard to predict, especially given the fact that the Chinese




(1) For a general discussion of Chinese intellectuals' sense
of mission, see Chow(1960:11-15). See also Grieder(1981)
Goldman(1981) for studies of the political roles of modern
Chinese intellectuals. See Rieff(1969) and Lipset
Basu(1976) for discussions of the political roles of Western
intellectuals.
(2) According to Huntington(1979:9), in the fullest sense,'
political generation' should be an age cohort in which
members share certain political characteristics and in which
they have a consciousness of themselves as a group, but-in
addition there is an interaction among the members to
achieve political results. The political activists in Hong
Kong, therefore, form a political generation in the fullest
sense of the word. However, as they are but a small section
of the cohort, they should be more accurately characterised
as a 'generation unit'.See Mannheim(1952) for a discussion
of the concept of 'generation unit'.
(3) This is the conclusion reached by Saunders(1979:127-136)
after a review of studies of community politics in advanced
countries.
(4)Given the lack of clear and firm ideology, we can expect,
some of the the groups at least, may behave like the
'personality parties' found in Thailand in its short period
of 'party politics', fragile and ephemeral in organisation,
even when there is a significant element of direct election
in the Legislative Council (See Kramol, 1982).
(5)There can be, of course, different courses of economic
development, with different socio-political implications.
But experiences from Germany in Nineteenth Century to Latin
America today seem to support this line of thought, and that
is why 'late-developers' are seldom viable democracies.
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APPENDIX
Profiles of the Interviewees
Age Education Occupation Group Membership





Mr. B 30 University Assistant to Association for
Legislative Democracy and
Councillor Public Justice
Mr. C 26 University Researcher Hong Kong Affairs
Society
Mr. D 44 Advanced Physician/ Hong Kong Affairs
Degree Teacher in Society
Post-secondary
institution
Mr. E 37 Advanced Teacher in Hong Kong Observers
Degree Post-secondary
institution
Mr. F 37 Advanced Teacher in Hong Kong People's
Degree Post-secondary association
Institution
Mr. G 28 Advanced Student Meeting Poin
Degree
Mr. H 34 Advanced Teacher in Meeting Point
Degree Post-secondary
Institution
Mr I Advanced35 Teacher in Meeting Point
Decree Post-secondary
Institution
UniversityMr. J 27 School Teacher New Hong Kon
Society
Mr. K 35 Secondary Civil Servant Progressive
School Hong Kong
Society
Mr. L 27 University Student Society tor
Social Research


